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REVIVING LEGISLATIVE GENERALITY 
EVAN C. ZOLDAN* 
The Supreme Court does not recognize a constitutional principle 
disfavoring special legislation, that is, legislation that singles out 
identifiable individuals for benefits or harms that are not applied to the 
rest of the population.  As a result, both Congress and state legislatures 
routinely enact special legislation despite the fact that it has been linked to 
a variety of social harms, including corruption and the exacerbation of 
social inequality.  But the Court’s weak protections against special 
legislation, and the resulting harms, are not inevitable.  Instead, special 
legislation can be limited by what may be called a value of legislative 
generality, that is, a principle that legislation should be disfavored as 
suspect simply because it singles out identifiable individuals for special 
treatment. 
In this Article, I argue that the value of legislative generality should be 
enforced as an independent constitutional principle.  Three pillars—
history, text, and philosophical considerations—support the conclusion 
that legislative generality is a principle of constitutional significance.  
First, the history of the revolutionary period leading up to the framing of 
the Constitution suggests that a key purpose of the Constitution was to 
address evils associated with special legislation.  Second, the Constitution 
contains a number of under-enforced clauses that, when read together and 
in context, delineate a norm of legislative generality.  Third, an 
interpretation of the Constitution that includes a value of legislative 
generality fits well with a number of philosophical traditions and leads to 
normatively attractive results.  Together, these pillars support the 
conclusion that legislative generality is a value with constitutional weight 
and suggest that current constitutional doctrine should be modified to give 
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effect to this principle.  I conclude by calling for heightened judicial 
scrutiny over special legislation that offends the value of legislative 
generality, including contemporary special legislation in the areas of 
immigration, public benefits, and criminal law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Is there no danger of a Legislative despotism? 
Theory & practice both proclaim it.1 
—James Wilson 
The principle that rules of conduct ought to apply generally to all of 
society’s members, rather than single out individuals for special 
treatment, has long been advocated by jurists and philosophers of law.  
In his foundational text, The Morality of Law, Lon Fuller argues that 
law’s internal morality requires that rules of conduct operate on the 
population generally rather than in a patternless set of orders to 
individuals.2  Fuller’s conclusion echoes and expands on a centuries-old 
tradition; Cicero condemned as “unjust” the Roman legislative practice 
of singling out individuals for special treatment.3  The value articulated 
by Fuller and Cicero, that law ought to be generally applicable, is 
expressed in a number of clauses in the American Constitution: for 
example, the Bill of Attainder Clauses prohibit certain types of laws that 
single out individuals for punishment without trial; more generally, the 
Equal Protection Clause manifests the principle that the law ought to 
treat like cases alike.  But despite these clauses of the Constitution, and 
despite the intuitive and rhetorical power of the principle articulated by 
Fuller and Cicero, both Congress and state legislatures routinely pass 
laws that single out identifiable individuals for special treatment.  This 
type of law, called “special legislation,” is often criticized but rarely 
invalidated by the courts.  A well-known, but far from unique, example 
of special legislation is the statute enacted in the wake of the Terri 
Schiavo affair. 
Terri Schiavo was just twenty-six years old when she fell into the 
persistent vegetative state that would last the rest of her life.4  After 
eight years of constant medical care, during which time Schiavo never 
regained consciousness, her husband moved the court to order the 
 
1.  1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 254 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911) [hereinafter FARRAND]. 
2.  LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 46–48 (rev. ed. 1969). 
3.  MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, On the Laws, in ON THE COMMONWEALTH AND ON 
THE LAWS 105, 173 (James E.G. Zetzel ed., 1999). 
4.  Barbara A. Noah, Politicizing the End of Life: Lessons from the Schiavo Controversy, 
59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 107, 107 (2004). 
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withdrawal of her artificial life support.5  Her parents objected, setting 
off a prolonged legal battle to determine whether Schiavo, who had left 
no living will, would have wanted to be kept alive artificially “or 
whether she would wish to permit a natural death process to take its 
course.”6  The court found that Schiavo would have wanted her life 
support removed,7 and after several more years of appeals and 
remands,8 the hospice facility in which she resided was ordered to 
withhold food and water, permitting her to die.9   
Schiavo’s tragic situation triggered a media frenzy; it not only 
sparked a heated argument over the right to die, but it also rekindled 
smoldering national debates over issues as far-reaching and divisive as 
abortion, stem cell research, and human cloning.10  In reaction to the 
publicity surrounding the order to withhold her life support, Congress 
enacted a statute entitled an “Act for the Relief of the Parents of 
Theresa Marie Schiavo.”11  “Terri’s Law,” as the statute was called,12 
permitted “any parent” of Terri Schiavo to bring suit to redress the 
decision to stop providing her with food and medical treatment.13  
Although belabored debates often grind the legislative machinery to a 
halt, Terri’s Law was rushed through the legislative process.  It was 
passed by the Senate the same day that it was introduced and was 
passed by the House, presented to the President, and signed into law all 
on the following day.14  Through Terri’s Law, Congress wiped away the 
previous decade of state court litigation over Schiavo’s intentions.15 
 
5.  In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
6.  Id. at 180. 
7.  Id. at 176–80. 
8.  Stephen G. Calabresi, The Terri Schiavo Case: In Defense of the Special Law Enacted 
by Congress and President Bush, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 151, 151–52 (2006); Noah, supra note 4, 
at 114–15. 
9.  In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GD-003, 2005 WL 459634, at *2 (Fla. Cir. 
Ct. Feb. 25, 2005).  
10.  E.g., Rafael Lorente, Congress Turning its Focus to Life Issues—Schiavo Efforts 
May Be Sign of Future Battles, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 25, 2005, at 11A, available at 
2005 WLNR 23621548; Vickie Chachere, Schiavo Case Latest Chapter in Culture War, 
CINCINNATI POST, Mar. 28, 2005, at A3, available at 2005 WLNR 4972036. 
11.  Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005). 
12.  Calabresi, supra note 8, at 152. 
13.  Terri’s Law § 2, 119 Stat. at 15. 
14.  151 CONG. REC. 5483, 5486–87 (2005) (statement of Sen. Frist); id. at 5447, 5480–81 
(statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner); George W. Bush, Statement on Signing Legislation for 
the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, 1 PUB. PAPERS 500 (Mar. 21, 2005). 
15.  Terri’s Law § 2, 119 Stat. at 15. 
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No matter where one stands on the social issues raised by the 
Schiavo case, there is no doubt that Terri’s Law was a remarkable piece 
of legislation.  Unlike most laws, which provide generally applicable 
rules of conduct for society at large, Terri’s Law made an exception 
from the general rules for two readily identifiable individuals, Schiavo’s 
parents.  Even a cursory look at Terri’s Law reveals why special 
legislation is controversial.  By creating an exception from the generally 
applicable laws for a single individual or small, identifiable group, 
special legislation is apt to treat similar cases differently.  Because it is 
enacted to favor, or to harm, named individuals, special legislation often 
arises from legislative passion or prejudice rather than from serious 
deliberation.  By substituting legislative conclusions for facts normally 
found by judges and juries, special legislation encroaches on the judicial 
function.  For these reasons, among others, special legislation long has 
been criticized. 
But, despite these and other normative problems, both Congress and 
state legislatures routinely enact special legislation.  And the Supreme 
Court, when reviewing special legislation, subjects it only to minimal 
scrutiny.  Moreover, although they have wrestled to articulate a legal 
basis for requiring meaningful scrutiny for special legislation, scholars so 
far have failed to articulate a coherent constitutional theory that 
protects against abusive special legislation.  The principle introduced in 
this Article fills the gaps left by modern jurisprudence and scholarship 
by offering a more robust approach to the problem of special legislation.  
I explore forgotten parts of our constitutional history, our philosophical 
traditions, and nearly forgotten clauses of the Constitution itself.  Based 
on this inquiry, I conclude that there is a principle that may be used to 
restrain special legislation; this principle—which may be called the value 
of legislative generality—should be judicially enforced as an 
independent constitutional principle. 
In Part II, I define special legislation and identify the kinds of special 
laws that Congress and state legislatures enact. 
In Part III, I examine the response of courts and scholars to special 
legislation.  The Supreme Court has rejected a constitutional principle 
that would restrict special legislation because of its particularized effect.  
Similarly, although scholars continue to wrestle with special legislation, 
they have failed so far to articulate a robust principle constraining 
special legislation that is rooted in the history of the framing of the 
Constitution, American philosophical traditions, and the Constitution’s 
text. 
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In Part IV, I seek to fill the gap left by courts and scholars by 
identifying the constitutional bases on which a value of legislative 
generality rests.  First, the history of the revolutionary period leading up 
to the framing of the Constitution suggests that a key purpose of the 
Constitution was to address evils associated with special legislation.  
Second, the Constitution contains a number of under-enforced clauses 
that, when read together and in context, delineate a norm of legislative 
generality.  Third, an interpretation of the Constitution that includes a 
value of legislative generality fits well with a number of philosophical 
traditions and leads to normatively attractive results. 
In Part V, I turn to the first of the constitutional bases identified in 
Part IV—the history leading up to the framing of the Constitution—to 
analyze the revolutionary generation’s experiences with special 
legislation.  This inquiry reveals that the revolutionary generation 
enacted special legislation that, like modern special legislation, granted 
special privileges and levied special penalties.  After years of enacting 
special laws, including statutes confiscating property, statutes granting 
immunity from civil and criminal prosecution, statutes granting or 
withdrawing property rights, and bills of attainder, the revolutionary 
generation became acutely aware of special legislation’s negative 
consequences.  By the time of the framing of the Constitution, and 
wearied by a decade of abusive special laws, they repudiated the power 
of the legislature to enact special laws. 
In Part VI, I argue that the value of legislative generality should be 
enforced in a way that gives meaning to the historical experiences of the 
revolutionary generation.  As a result, the value of legislative generality 
should be enforced as a stand-alone constitutional value, much as the 
judiciary enforces the constitutional right to privacy or the principle of 
separation of powers.  Enforcing this value not only makes sense in light 
of historical evidence, but also would rationalize an incoherent area of 
the law. 
This Article focuses on historical evidence supporting the value of 
legislative generality.  As a result, its conclusions should be of interest to 
the many judges16 and scholars17 who recognize historical experience as 
 
16.  E.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559 (2014) (“[W]e put significant 
weight upon historical practice.” (emphasis removed)). 
17.  E.g., Jane Harris Aiken, Ex Post Facto in the Civil Context: Unbridled Punishment, 
81 KY. L.J. 323, 326 (1992–1993); Harlan Grant Cohen, “Undead” Wartime Cases: Stare 
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one of the traditional methods used to find meaning in constitutional 
text.  This includes both originalists as well as non-originalists who, like 
me, consider history probative, but not dispositive, of constitutional 
meaning. 
But even for those courts and scholars who have little interest in 
historical analysis, even as one method of constitutional interpretation, 
the value of legislative generality possesses other virtues.  For example, 
measured by many standards of justice, laws that single out individuals 
for special treatment are suspect.  They tend to treat like cases 
differently, lead to conflicts of interest—and even corruption—and 
inure to the benefit of the well-connected.  Judicial recognition of a 
value of legislative generality would allow courts to invalidate many of 
the most abusive modern special laws.  In sum, although this Article is 
limited, due to space constraints, to the historical underpinnings of the 
value of legislative generality, non-historically contingent arguments are 
central to a robust articulation of this value.  These arguments, sketched 
in Part IV, will be addressed more fully in later work. 
II. THE PHENOMENON OF SPECIAL LEGISLATION 
Special legislation—that is, legislation that singles out an individual 
or small, known group for special treatment—is an accepted fact of 
modern legislative practice.  Special laws are enacted both by Congress 
and state legislatures.  They are enacted in a variety of substantive legal 
areas, including tax, immigration, criminal law, and public benefits.  
They are enacted both as private laws and public laws; they are used 
both to confer benefits and levy detriments.  In order to facilitate 
analysis of the causes and consequences of the prevalence of special 
legislation, this Part will define and categorize the most common types 
of special laws. 
A. Special Legislation Defined 
“Special legislation” is legislation that singles out an individual 
natural person or corporation, or a small number of identifiable 
individuals, for treatment that is not applicable to the general 
population.18  Although special legislation can include legislation either 
 
Decisis and the Lessons of History, 84 TUL. L. REV. 957 (2010); Melissa L. Saunders, Equal 
Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L. REV. 245, 252–53 (1997). 
18.  See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 
291, 315 (2007) (“‘[S]pecial’ or ‘partial’ legislation” includes legislation that “pick[s] out a 
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at the state or federal level, it excludes government action by the 
executive and judicial branches.  For example, a government 
prosecutor’s decision to prosecute an accused individual is “special” in 
the sense that it singles out one person for particularized treatment.  
However, this is not special legislation because it is a decision by the 
executive rather than the legislature.  Similarly, decisions of executive 
agencies, like a state zoning board’s decision to grant a variance or the 
Army’s decision to award a government contract, are not legislation 
and, therefore, do not fall within the scope of this article.  Judicial 
action, likewise, is not legislation; therefore, a court order awarding a 
money judgment is not contemplated by this Article.19 
There is no doubt that constitutional constraints on government 
action taken by the executive and judicial branches are important issues; 
nevertheless, this Article focuses on special legislation alone for three 
reasons.  First, as described in Part V, Americans in the years leading up 
to the framing of the Constitution expressed particular concern with 
special legislation as opposed to particularized action by the judiciary or 
executive branches.  Second, there is an abundance of literature 
examining issues related to particularized government action in the 
context of executive and judicial action.  In particular, much has been 
written about restrictions imposed by the Equal Protection and Due 
 
group for special benefits or special burdens.”); Robert M. Ireland, The Problem of Local, 
Private, and Special Legislation in the Nineteenth-Century United States, 46 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 271, 271 (2004) (special legislation includes both “local and private legislation” and is 
distinguished from “[g]eneral legislation”); Dale F. Rubin, Public Aid to Professional Sports 
Teams—A Constitutional Disgrace: The Battle to Revive Judicial Rulings and State 
Constitutional Enactments Prohibiting Public Subsidies to Private Corporations, 30 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 393, 399 (1999) (defining special legislation as “laws . . . made applicable to a particular 
person, group or thing within a specified class, which are not applicable to the entire class”); 
Comment, The Constitutionality of Private Acts of Congress, 49 YALE L.J. 712, 712 n.1 (1940) 
(special legislation includes legislation applying to “only one or a few determinable 
individuals”). 
19.  Moreover, “special legislation” does not include all legislation that makes 
distinctions based on membership in a class; it does not include industry-specific legislation, 
like legislation affecting the banking industry, which has thousands of members.  It also 
excludes legislation that levies detriments on a group, for example, because of an immutable 
characteristic, like race or religion.  Although the issue of class legislation is surely an 
important one, it is one that has been well-articulated by others and therefore will not be 
repeated here.  See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Pluralist Theory of the Equal Protection 
Clause, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1239, 1239, 1246–47 (2009); Saunders, supra note 17, at 254, 
289–90; see also Balkin, supra note 18, at 315–16; Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without 
Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L REV. 481, 528–30 (2004); V.F. Nourse & Sarah A. Maguire, The Lost 
History of Governance and Equal Protection, 58 DUKE L.J. 955, 959–65, 995–96 (2009). 
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Process Clauses;20 by contrast, there is a dearth of scholarship addressing 
particularized legislative action.  Third, as will be described more fully in 
future work, a value of legislative generality, as opposed to a value of 
generality in the executive and judicial branches, makes the most sense 
given the different roles of the three branches of government.21  For 
these reasons, the scope of this Article is limited to special legislation. 
B. Identifying and Classifying Special Legislation 
It can be challenging to identify special legislation because of the 
wide variety of ways in which it is enacted.  Although some special laws 
name a single individual in the law’s title,22 other laws name a number of 
individuals.23  Still others refrain from naming any individuals but, by 
intent or operation, apply only to a small number of identifiable 
individuals.24  Moreover, special laws may provide either benefits or 
detriments and may be enacted either as criminal or civil statutes.  As 
described below, Congress and state legislatures routinely enact laws 
denominated as public or private, that grant special benefits or special 
detriments, and that may be construed as either criminal or civil laws.  
No matter which of these attributes a statute possesses, it properly may 
be considered “special” legislation if it singles out an individual person, 
or small, identifiable group, for treatment not experienced by the 
general population.25 
1. Both Public and Private Laws Can Be Special Legislation. 
Congress and state legislatures occasionally enact “private laws,” 
which, as opposed to more common “public laws,” are denominated as 
being “for the benefit” or “relief” of a particular named party.26  In 
 
20.  See infra text accompanying notes 112–16. 
21.  See FULLER, supra note 2, at 170–76. 
22.  E.g., Priv. L. No. 112-1 (2012). 
23.  E.g., Priv. L. No. 108-4, 118 Stat. 4028 (2004). 
24.  E.g., Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412 n.13 
(1983) (citing Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 247–48 & n.20 (1978)) 
(state statute perhaps aimed at “one particular employer planning to terminate its pension 
plan”); Foretich v. United States, 351 F.3d 1198, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that the 
Elizabeth Morgan Act, Pub. L. No. 104-205, § 350, 110 Stat. 2951, 2979 (1996), “targeted” a 
single individual despite its purported generality). 
25.  See supra note 18. 
26.  E.g., Priv. L. No. 112-1; see also Justin R. Long, State Constitutional Prohibitions on 
Special Laws, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 719, 723 (2012). 
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recent years, Congress has enacted private legislation exempting named 
individuals from the general requirements of the immigration and 
naturalization laws,27 granting money payments to former government 
employees,28 and granting an individual the right to live on public 
lands.29  However, because of state restrictions on private laws,30 high-
profile scandals associated with private legislation,31 and restrictions 
imposed on the introduction of private bills in the United States House 
of Representatives,32 their numbers have declined in recent years.33  
Nevertheless, Congress still enacts private bills in practically every 
legislative session.34 
Somewhat harder to identify,35 but far more common, are public 
laws so limited in scope that, like private laws, they apply only to an 
individual or small, identifiable group.36  A well-known example is the 
legislation, noted above, that granted a private remedy to the parents of 
Terri Schiavo.37  Although styled as a public law, Terri’s Law applied by 
its terms only to “[a]ny parent of Theresa Marie Schiavo”; and in 
section 7 of the Act, entitled “No Precedent for Future Legislation,” the 
law provided that “[n]othing in this Act shall constitute a precedent with 
respect to future legislation, including the provision of private relief 
 
27.  E.g., Priv. L. No. 112-1; see MARGARET MIKYUNG LEE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
PRIVATE IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION 2 (2007).  
28.  Priv. L. No. 107-4, 116 Stat. 3122 (2002); Priv. L. No. 107-3, 116 Stat. 3121 (2002). 
29.  Priv. L. No. 109-1, 120 Stat. 3705 (2006). 
30.  Ireland, supra note 18, at 299 (“By the early twentieth century most states had by 
constitutional revision specifically prohibited a variety of special legislation.”); see also 
Comment, Special Legislation Discriminating Against Specified Individuals and Groups, 51 
YALE L.J. 1358, 1358 (1942) (“All but four of the state constitutions contain express 
restrictions against the enactment of special legislation.”).  However, state courts have tended 
to construe state constitutional bans on special legislation narrowly, permitting state 
legislatures to enact special laws with a great deal of discretion despite these restrictions.  See, 
e.g., Rubin, supra note 18, at 398 n.22. 
31.  A “series of corruption scandals such as Abscam, involving payoffs for the 
sponsorship of private immigration laws, culminated in the expulsion of one Member of the 
House of Representatives and led to a decline in private immigration laws, which were 
perceived as tainted in general by the scandals.”  LEE, supra note 27, at 9. 
32.  Id. at 4, 7–8. 
33.  Id. at 9. 
34.  E.g., Priv. L. No. 112-1 (2012); Priv. L. No. 111-1, 124 Stat. 4523 (2010). 
35.  Indeed, public laws sometimes are used in place of private bills because they are 
harder to identify and therefore draw less scrutiny.  See LEE, supra note 27, at 30.  
36.  E.g., Terri’s Law, Pub. L. No. 109-3, § 2, 119 Stat. 15, 15–16 (2005); see also 
Comment, supra note 18, at 712 n.1. 
37.  Terri’s Law §§ 2–3, 119 Stat. at 15. 
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bills.”38  Despite the obviously special nature of Terri’s Law, it was 
enacted as a public law.39 
Similarly, Congress and state legislatures routinely enact public laws 
that single out an individual natural person,40 corporation,41 or small, 
identifiable group42 for special treatment without explicitly naming these 
individuals in the statute.  For example, in the guise of a narrowly drawn 
public law, the State of Minnesota provided a very specific definition of 
companies that would be penalized for terminating their pension plans.43  
The Supreme Court held that this law, although facially general in 
application, in fact “was aimed at specific employers” or perhaps even 
“one particular employer planning to terminate its pension plan.”44  
Similarly, in the Elizabeth Morgan Act, Congress exempted a mother 
and daughter from the ongoing jurisdiction of a court in a custody 
dispute.45  Although the law was drafted to be facially neutral, the court 
held that it too was designed to reach only a particular pending case.46  
Like Terri’s Law, these laws made exceptions for particular, identifiable 
individuals or small, known groups from the generally applicable laws 
that otherwise would have governed their disputes.  Because they single 
out a known set of individuals, these narrowly tailored public laws, just 
like private laws that overtly grant special treatment to named 
individuals,47 properly can be called “special legislation.”48 
 
38.  Id. §§ 2, 7, 119 Stat. at 15–16. 
39.  Terri’s Law, 119 Stat. at 15–16. 
40.  E.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 158 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring); Foretich 
v. United States, 351 F.3d 1198, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Elizabeth Morgan Act, Pub. L. 
No. 104-205, § 350, 110 Stat. 2951, 2979 (1996)). 
41.  Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412 n.13 (1983) 
(citing Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 247–48 & n.20 (1978)). 
42.  Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 591 
(1983) (challenged state tax law “targets a small group of newspapers”). 
43.  Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U.S. at 247–48 & n.20. 
44.  Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 412 n.13 (citing Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U.S. at 
247–48 & n.20). 
45.  Elizabeth Morgan Act § 350, 110 Stat. at 2979. 
46.  Foretich v. United States, 351 F.3d 1198, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
47.  E.g., Priv. L. No. 112-1 (2012); Priv. L. No. 109-1, 120 Stat. 3705 (2006); Priv. L. No. 
107-4, 116 Stat. 3122 (2002); Priv. L. No. 107-3, 116 Stat. 3121 (2002). 
48.  See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 18, at 315; Ireland, supra note 18, at 271; Rubin, supra 
note 18, at 399; Comment, supra note 18, at 712 n.1. 
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2. Categories of Special Legislation 
Special laws can touch on a wide variety of substantive subject 
matters, including public spending, immigration, and taxation, to name a 
few.  No matter the substantive subject matter of the law, special 
legislation can provide special benefits or special detriments and can be 
considered civil or criminal in nature.  As a result, special laws of all 
types can be placed into one of four conceptual categories: special 
benefit civil legislation, special detriment civil legislation, special benefit 
criminal legislation, and special detriment criminal legislation.  
Legislation falling into each of these categories has been enacted by 
Congress and state legislatures since the Constitution’s ratification and, 
in many cases, was enacted by the states prior to the ratification of the 
Constitution.  As will be described more fully in Part V, special 
legislation was particularly rampant during the period between 
independence from Britain and the framing of the Constitution. 
a. Special Benefit Civil Legislation 
The most common category of special legislation today is special 
benefit civil legislation.  State legislatures and Congress routinely 
provide special benefits by statute, including transferring public funds to 
particular natural persons49 or corporations,50 providing preferential tax 
treatment to specific corporations,51 granting exemptions from generally 
applicable statutes and regulations,52 and extending statutes of 
limitations for particular cases.53  Perhaps the most widespread example 
 
49.  E.g., Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-46, § 145, 127 Stat. 558, 
565 (2013); Priv. L. No. 108-5, 118 Stat. 4030 (2004); Priv. L. No. 107-2, 116 Stat. 3119 (2002); 
Priv. L. No. 103-5, 108 Stat. 5064 (1994); Priv. L. No. 103-3, 108 Stat. 5062 (1994). 
50.  Rubin, supra note 18, at 398 n.22; see also Kathryn Wakefield, Comment, Just-in-
Time Legislation: Do Corporation-Specific Statutes Violate State Constitutional Prohibitions 
on Special Legislation?, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 843, 853 (2000). 
51.  See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A 
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 80 (1991). 
52.  Priv. L. No. 111-2, 124 Stat. 4525 (2010); Priv. L. No. 111-1, 124 Stat. 4523 (2010); 
Priv. L. No. 108-6, 118 Stat. 4032 (2004); Priv. L. No. 108-4, 118 Stat. 4028 (2004); Priv. L. No. 
108-3, 118 Stat. 4026 (2004); Priv. L. No. 108-1, 118 Stat. 4023 (2004); Priv. L. No. 107-5, 116 
Stat. 3123 (2002); Priv. L. No. 107-1, 115 Stat. 2471 (2001) (all granting exemptions from the 
Immigration and Nationality Act and reducing the total number of visas otherwise available); 
see also Priv. L. No. 105-4, 111 Stat. 2699 (1997) (granting citizenship retroactively to permit 
beneficiary to be eligible for benefits only available to citizens). 
53.  E.g., Merly v. State, 558 A.2d 977, 984–85 (Conn. 1989); Osborn v. Rhode Island, 
No. NC84-0101, 1992 WL 813531, at *6 (R.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 23, 1992). 
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of this type of special law is private immigration legislation.54  There 
have been thousands of private immigration bills enacted;55 these special 
laws typically name a single individual56 or small group57 and provide 
that, notwithstanding generally applicable legal requirements, the 
named individuals are granted legal permanent resident status.58  
Another common type of special benefit legislation is the payment of 
public funds to named individuals; in two recent examples of special 
transfers of public wealth, Congress provided for gratuitous payments of 
$193,40059 and $174,000,60 respectively, to the widows of two deceased 
Senators. 
b. Special Detriment Civil Legislation 
Special detriment civil legislation, widespread throughout the 
revolutionary period,61 is common today as well.  The paradigmatic 
example of special detriment civil legislation is a legislative taking.62  In 
one recent, well-publicized example of a legislative taking, Congress 
enacted a statute taking property from the City of San Diego, setting 
aside a California state court ruling that enjoined the transfer under 
state law.63  Outside of the takings arena, Congress and state legislatures 
enact laws that levy special detriments on particular corporations64 or 
abrogate specific contracts.65 
 
54.  E.g., 124 Stat. at 4525; 124 Stat. at 4523. 
55.  LEE, supra note 27, at 2. 
56.  E.g., 115 Stat. at 2471. 
57.  E.g., 118 Stat. at 4028. 
58.  E.g., 124 Stat. at 4525; 124 Stat. at 4523. 
59.  Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-6, 
§ 1601, 127 Stat. 198, 426 (2013). 
60.  Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-46, § 145, 127 Stat. 558, 565 
(2013). 
61.  See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 302 (enlarged ed. 1992); LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS 71 (1999); W.P. Trent, The Case of Josiah Philips, 1 AM. HIST. REV. 444, 454 (1896). 
62.  E.g., Mt. Soledad Veterans Memorial Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 109-272, § 2, 
120 Stat. 770, 770–72 (2006); Paulson v. City of San Diego, 475 F.3d 1047, 1048 (9th Cir. 
2007); see also 16 U.S.C. § 79c(b)(1) (2012). 
63.  § 2, 120 Stat. at 770–72. 
64.  E.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 
591 (1983) (challenged state tax law “targets a small group of newspapers”); Energy Reserves 
Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412 n.13 (1983) (citing Allied Structural 
Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 247–48 & n.20 (1978)). 
65.  E.g., U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 11–14 (1977). 
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c. Special Detriment Criminal Legislation 
The paradigm of special detriment legislation in the criminal context 
is the bill of attainder.66  Although the newly independent states enacted 
thousands of bills of attainder during the revolutionary era,67 perhaps 
the most famous was the Virginia Assembly’s bill declaring Josiah 
Philips and his gang guilty of high treason.68  When the authorities were 
unable to apprehend Philips, whom they believed to be the leader of a 
“disorderly mob,”69 the Virginia Assembly attainted Philips in order to 
avoid “the delays which would attend” proceeding “according to the 
usual forms and procedures of the courts of law.”70 
Although most special detriment criminal legislation effectively has 
been barred by the Constitution’s prohibition on bills of attainder, 
modern legislatures still occasionally impose special criminal detriments.  
For example, responding to Cold War anti-Communist fervor, Congress 
enacted a statute specifically directed at deporting one particular 
person, Harry Bridges, because of his affiliation with the Communist 
Party.71 
 
66.  ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 
1787, at 93 (1956); LEVY, supra note 61, at 68; GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 279 (1969); see also Comment, The Bounds of 
Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 
330, 330–31 (1962). 
67.  CHAFEE, supra note 66, at 93; LEVY, supra note 61, at 70–71; WOOD, supra note 66, 
at 279; Trent, supra note 61, at 454; see Comment, supra note 66, at 331. 
68.  An Act to Attaint Josiah Phillips and Others, Unless They Render Themselves to 
Justice Within a Certain Time, ch. 12 (1778), in 9 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A 
COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE 
LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 463, 463–64 (William Waller Hening ed., Richmond, J. 
& G. Cochran 1821) [hereinafter STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA].  Like many bills of 
attainder enacted in England, Philips’s attainder was conditional; that is, he was attainted of 
treason only if he refused to turn himself in to the authorities.  See id.; LEVY, supra note 61, 
at 72. 
69.  Trent, supra note 61, at 445 (quoting THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION OF 
DELEGATES FOR THE COUNTIES AND CORPORATIONS IN THE COLONY OF VIRGINIA 9 
(rprt. 1816) (1775)). 
70.  An Act to Attaint Josiah Phillips and Others, Unless They Render Themselves to 
Justice Within a Certain Time, ch. 12, in 9 STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, supra note 68, 
at 463–64.  Philips was captured alive and, despite the outstanding bill of attainder, was tried 
and executed for robbery rather than for treason.  Why Philips was tried for robbery rather 
than executed for treason is subject to historical debate.  LEVY, supra note 61, at 72–74; 
Trent, supra note 61, at 448. 
71.  H.R. 9766, 76th CONG. (3d Sess. 1940); Maurice A. Roberts, The Harry Bridges 
Cases, 76 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1385, 1387 (1999).  The deportation of Harry Bridges is 
 
 640 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:625 
d. Special Benefit Criminal Legislation 
Also less common today, special benefit criminal legislation has also 
been enacted in the United States since the revolutionary era.72  During 
the war for independence, the Vermont Legislature pardoned, by name, 
the instigators of a riot because of their previous service in the 
Continental Army.73  In a more recent example, the State of California 
granted immunity from criminal prosecution to specific government 
officials who had been determined by a state court to have violated the 
law.74 
III. JUDICIAL AND SCHOLARLY RESPONSE TO SPECIAL LEGISLATION 
A value of legislative generality—that is, a principle that there is 
something suspect about legislation that singles out known individuals 
for special treatment—is not enforced as an independent constitutional 
value.  Courts, while subjecting special laws to judicial scrutiny in 
individual cases, have failed to conceptualize special legislation as a 
category of law deserving coherent and meaningful restriction due to its 
lack of generality.  Moreover, scholarship addressing special legislation 
has not offered a robust theory that would justify restraining special 
legislation because of its particularized effect.  As a result, the value of 
legislative generality remains largely unenforced, and special legislation 
remains an accepted part of the legislative process. 
A. The Supreme Court Does Not Effectively or  
Coherently Restrain Special Legislation. 
The Supreme Court neither articulates a principle that coherently 
addresses special legislation nor meaningfully restricts the power of the 
legislature to enact special legislation.  The Court expressly has rejected 
a principle that would treat legislative specification as constitutionally 
 
analogous to the Parliamentary banishments enacted in England.  See CHAFEE, supra note 
66, at 117. 
72.  E.g., ADDRESS OF THE COUNCIL OF CENSORS (Feb. 14, 1786) [hereinafter 
VERMONT REPORT], in RECORDS OF THE COUNCIL OF CENSORS OF THE STATE OF 
VERMONT 58, 70 (Paul S. Gillies & D. Gregory Sanford eds., 1991). 
73.  Id. 
74.  Act of Feb. 20, 2009, ch.9, § 5, 2009 Cal. Stat. 3418, 3419 (“Notwithstanding any 
other law, no governmental entity, or officer or employee of a governmental entity, shall 
incur any liability or be subject to prosecution or disciplinary action because of benefits 
provided to a judge under the official action of a governmental entity prior to the effective 
date of this act on the ground that those benefits were not authorized under law.”). 
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suspect.  Moreover, when the Court has reviewed individual special 
laws, it has announced a variety of overlapping but inconsistent tests, 
rendering a coherent principle concerning special legislation impossible 
within the confines of current doctrine. 
1. The Court Does Not Treat Special Legislation as Suspect Because of 
Its Particularized Effect. 
The Supreme Court’s modern cases do not treat special legislation as 
constitutionally defective because of its lack of generality.  In Plaut,75 a 
group of investors brought suit against an investment company for 
securities fraud; the Court held that the fraud suit was brought after the 
applicable statute of limitations, and the suits were dismissed.76  In 
response, Congress retroactively abrogated this decision, providing that 
the dismissed suits would be treated as if timely filed.  In Plaut, the 
Court invalidated the statute but definitively rejected the argument that 
the statute was defective because it targeted a specific class of cases or a 
particular defendant.77 
The Court held that whether Congress singled out a group of 
lawsuits for special treatment did not affect the law’s validity.  Viewing 
the issue as one of separation of powers, the Court noted that neither 
favoritism nor particularized action on the part of the legislature 
rendered the statute constitutionally infirm.78  The Court dismissed the 
notion that “there is something wrong with particularized legislative 
action,” noting that, although “legislatures usually act through laws of 
general applicability, that is by no means their only legitimate mode of 
action.”79  Even laws that single out an individual natural person or 
corporation, the Court held, “are not on that account invalid.”80  The 
Court noted that Congress long has enacted private bills and reaffirmed 
that Congress is permitted to legislate even for “a legitimate class of 
one.”81  The Court specifically rejected Justice Breyer’s concurrence, in 
which he expressed some concern that a law that retroactively reopens 
 
75.  Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 214–15 (1995). 
76.  Id. at 213–14 (citing Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 
U.S. 350 (1991)). 
77.  Id. at 238–39. 
78.  Id. at 228, 239. 
79.  Id. at 239 n.9. 
80.  Id. 
81.  Id. (quoting Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 472 (1977)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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previously dismissed but readily identifiable lawsuits could be used to 
oppress individual litigants.82 
Plaut’s sanction of particularized legislative action, and in particular 
its reiteration that Congress possesses the power to legislate for a 
“legitimate class of one,” typifies the modern rule that the legislature 
may, without offending the Constitution, enact a law that singles out a 
named individual so long as the focus of the enactment can be “fairly 
and rationally understood.”83  In Nixon, the Court considered a federal 
statute ordering the Administrator of General Services to take 
possession of all tape recordings made by President Nixon, who was 
specifically named in the statute.84  The Court recognized that the 
statute, in addition to singling out Nixon for special treatment, was 
“predominantly precipitated by a resolve to undo” a particular contract 
between the former President and the Administrator of General 
Services that described the scope of materials that would be donated to 
the public for keeping.85  Nevertheless, the Court held that this special 
law was constitutional because the law could be “rationally 
understood”86 as an “act of nonpunitive legislative policymaking.”87  
Similarly, the Court has upheld the constitutionality of a provision of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, although it recognized that the provision 
“granted a special benefit to a single litigant in a pending” case.88   
Although the Court has suggested that it will entertain a challenge to 
a statute brought by a plaintiff who has been singled out as a “class of 
one,” protection under this theory is limited.  A plaintiff may invoke a 
class of one theory under the Equal Protection Clause only when she is 
“intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated.”89  
 
82.  Compare id. at 238, with id. at 242–43 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
83.  Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472–73. 
84.  Id. at 433–34. 
85.  Id. at 431, 479. 
86.  Id. at 472. 
87.  Id. at 477. 
88.  Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 266 & n.22 (1995) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (noting that the law at issue in Landgraf “was intended to exempt a single 
disparate impact lawsuit against” a particular company (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 
511 U.S. 244, 258 (1994))).  Following the lead of the Supreme Court, state courts have 
declined to offer meaningful protection against special legislation.  See Long, supra note 26, at 
742–43.  Although many states have specific constitutional prohibitions in place designed to 
combat special legislation, state courts generally apply very lenient standards, akin to rational 
basis, when reviewing special laws.  Id. at 732, 759. 
89.  Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam). 
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Moreover, a class of one challenge is limited to “intentional and 
arbitrary” discrimination when there is “no rational basis” for the 
differential treatment.90  The Court has further limited the class of one 
theory to circumstances in which there is a “clear standard against which 
departures . . . could be readily assessed,” thus insulating state action 
from class of one equal protection review when the action is otherwise 
within the discretion of the state actor.91 
2. The Court Has Failed to Articulate a Coherent Method of 
Analyzing Special Legislation. 
Consistent with its statements in Plaut and Nixon that reject the 
notion that there is something wrong with particularized legislative 
action, the Court’s decisions reviewing special legislation do not 
describe a coherent principle indicating when special laws will run afoul 
of the Constitution.  Instead, when the Court examines special laws, it 
considers them under a variety of constitutional provisions, including 
the Equal Protection Clause,92 the Bill of Attainder and Ex Post Facto 
Clauses,93 the Spending Clause,94 the Takings Clause,95 the Contract 
Clause,96 and the Klein anti-rule of decision principle.97  When deciding 
 
90.  Id. (quoting Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota Cnty., 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923)). 
91.  Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric. 553 U.S. 591, 598, 602 (2008). 
92.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  Compare Engquist, 553 U.S. at 602, with Olech, 528 
U.S. at 564.  
93.  U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9–10. 
94.  Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  The Court exercises virtually no oversight over special legislation 
related to spending.  Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273–74 (1954) (per curiam) (“The 
power of Congress to dispose of any kind of property belonging to the United States ‘is 
vested in Congress without limitation.’” (quoting United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 
526, 537 (1840))); see also Comment, supra note 18, at 718–23.  Although the Court has 
suggested that the General Welfare Clause limits appropriations to expenditures designed “to 
provide for the general welfare,” it has consigned the “general welfare” determination to 
Congress’s discretion so long as Congress has not exercised “arbitrary power.”  Helvering v. 
Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 632, 640 (1937).  Accordingly, courts have “stretched to find public 
purposes in the most dubious spending schemes.”  Richard Delgado, Inequality “From the 
Top”: Applying an Ancient Prohibition to an Emerging Problem of Distributive Justice, 32 
UCLA L. REV. 100, 106 (1984). 
95.  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The Court has recognized that “the sovereign may not take 
the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even 
though A is paid just compensation.”  Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005).  
However, the Court has limited the application of the Takings Clause, holding that “a State 
may transfer property from one private party to another if future ‘use by the public’ is the 
purpose of the taking.”  Id. at 477, 488–89. 
96.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 
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cases under these provisions, the Court has formulated a number of 
different tests, applied different standards, and deferred to the 
legislature in varying degrees, depending on the clause invoked and the 
subject matter of the legislation.  For example, the Court provides 
almost no protection against special legislation related to public 
spending98 or immigration,99 and minimal protections against special 
legislation in the equal protection context.100  By contrast, the Court 
provides more significant protections in the context of takings101 and 
criminal law.102  As a result of this multifarious and inconsistent 
approach to dealing with special legislation, jurisprudence surrounding 
special legislation lacks coherence. 
a. Lack of Coherence Between Special Benefit and Special Detriment 
Legislation 
Supreme Court doctrine draws a sharp distinction between laws 
imposing special detriments and those providing special benefits.  The 
 
29−31 (1977) (holding that the Contract Clause prevents government self-dealing by 
prohibiting the states from breaching contracts to which they are a party in order to gain 
advantages for the government at the expense of the contracting party); see Evan C. Zoldan, 
The Permanent Seat of Government: An Unintended Consequence of Heightened Scrutiny 
Under the Contract Clause, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 163, 208–09 (2011). 
97.  Rooted in the principle of separation of powers, the Court has held that Congress 
may not prescribe a rule of decision in a pending court case.  United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 
(13 Wall.) 128, 143–46 (1872) (Congress may not deny federal courts jurisdiction “founded 
solely on the application of a rule of decision, in causes pending”).  Despite this prohibition, 
the Court’s reaction to laws that address particular cases have been mixed.  In Miller, the 
Court limited Klein, holding Congress is not prohibited from directing the court to alter an 
injunction previously entered by the court.  Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 344 (2000). 
98.  Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 
345, 356–57 (2008). 
99.  Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (“At the outset, it is important to underscore 
the limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration legislation.  This Court has repeatedly 
emphasized that ‘over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more 
complete than it is over’ the admission of aliens.” (quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. 
Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909))); see also James E. Pfander & Theresa R. Wardon, 
Reclaiming the Immigration Constitution of the Early Republic: Prospectivity, Uniformity, and 
Transparency, 96 VA. L. REV. 359, 429–30 (2010). 
100.  Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam). 
101.  Compare Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 472 (1977) (holding that the 
legislature can create a “legitimate class of one” as long as the distinction is “fairly . . . 
understood”), with Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005) (the legislature 
cannot “take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party 
B, even though A is paid just compensation”). 
102.  Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1867). 
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Court provides some protections against special detriment legislation 
under the Bill of Attainder, Takings, Ex Post Facto, and Equal 
Protection Clauses.103  However, no similar doctrine provides 
restrictions against special benefit legislation.104  As a result, special 
benefit legislation—like special immigration laws, laws providing civil 
and criminal immunity, and laws providing financial benefits to named 
parties—is subject to virtually no scrutiny under the Court’s current 
jurisprudence.  The incoherence of this doctrine is elucidated in the 
following example: as noted, Congress recently provided a $174,000 
gratuitous payment to Bonnie Englebardt Lautenberg, the widow of the 
late United States Senator Frank Lautenberg.105  This special benefit 
raises no constitutional concerns under the Court’s current doctrine.  
However, if Congress had enacted a law taking $174,000 from Mrs. 
Lautenberg, such a statute would raise concerns under the Equal 
Protection Clause, the Takings Clause, the Due Process Clause, and 
possibly the Ex Post Facto Clause.  In other words, the Court’s doctrine 
provides strikingly different protections against special legislation 
depending on whether the legislation imposes detriments or provides 
benefits. 
b. Lack of Coherence Between Criminal Laws and Civil Laws 
Supreme Court doctrine distinguishes between special laws 
denominated as criminal and those denominated as civil.  Although the 
Court restrains some special criminal laws under the Bill of Attainder 
and Ex Post Facto Clauses, it does not recognize analogous restrictions 
in the civil context.106  The following example demonstrates the 
incoherence of this distinction: in the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery 
Act (FERA) Amendments to the False Claims Act (FCA), Congress 
retroactively revived particular lawsuits dismissed pursuant to a narrow 
interpretation of the FCA.107  Courts are split, however, as to whether 
 
103.  E.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. at 469; Olech, 528 U.S. at 564; Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472–73; 
Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 323. 
104.  See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792; Bagenstos, supra note 98, at 356–57; see also Alabama v. 
Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273–74 (1954); Pfander & Wardon, supra note 99, at 429–30. 
105.  Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-46, § 145, 127 Stat. 558, 565 
(2013). 
106.  Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (opinion of Iredell, J.); Nixon, 433 
U.S. at 472–73. 
107.  Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4, 123 Stat. 
1617, 1621–25 (2009); S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 4, 10–12 (2009). 
 646 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:625 
the FCA is a “criminal” law within the meaning of the Ex Post Facto 
Clause.  Because the Ex Post Facto Clause extends only to criminal 
laws, only courts holding that the FCA is criminal have invalidated the 
revival of the dismissed FCA suits; by contrast, courts holding that the 
FCA is civil uphold the revival of these same suits.108 
c. Lack of Coherence Between State Laws and Federal Laws 
Finally, the Court draws a distinction between state laws and federal 
laws that single out individuals for special treatment.  When either a 
state or the federal government breaches a public contract, that is, a 
contract to which it is itself a party, it reallocates a burden that properly 
belongs to the entire body politic onto the contractor alone.  When a 
breach of this sort occurs through the enactment of a statute, therefore, 
it properly can be called special legislation because the breach affects 
particular contracts and known parties.109  However, despite the fact that 
a breach of a public contract reallocates burdens to known individuals 
irrespective of whether the contracting party is a state or the federal 
government, the Court treats breaches of public contract by the states 
differently than breaches by Congress.  A state’s ability to breach its 
own contractual obligations is narrowly limited to circumstances in 
which the law is “reasonable” and “necessary” to implement an 
“important public purpose.”110  By contrast, Congress is permitted to 
breach a contract to which it is itself a party unless it has committed 
“unmistakably” to bind its sovereign legislative power by contract,111 a 
far more lenient standard.  As a result, two otherwise identical contracts, 
and otherwise identical special laws breaching those contracts, will be 
subject to widely divergent legal standards depending on whether a state 
 
108.  Compare United States v. Hawley, 812 F. Supp. 2d 949, 961–62 (N.D. Iowa 2011) 
(holding that the FERA Amendments are unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clause 
because they are retroactive and punitive), and United States ex rel. Baker v. Cmty. Health 
Sys., Inc., 709 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1112 (D.N.M. 2010) (same), and United States ex rel. Sanders 
v. Allison Engine Co., 667 F. Supp. 2d 747, 753–54 (S.D. Ohio 2009), with United States ex rel. 
Miller v. Bill Harbert Int’l Constr., Inc., 608 F.3d 871, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the 
Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to the FCA), and United States ex rel. Drake v. NSI, 
Inc., 736 F. Supp. 2d 489, 502 (D. Conn 2010) (same). 
109.  Zoldan, supra note 96, at 209. 
110.  U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977).  The constitutional 
basis for the much-criticized United States Trust doctrine is the Contract Clause, which applies 
only against the states, not the federal government. 
111.  United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 871–72 (1996). 
 2014] REVIVING LEGISLATIVE GENERALITY 647 
or the federal government was the public entity that breached its 
obligation. 
B. Scholars Have Not Formulated a Robust Theory of Constitutional 
Protections Against Special Legislation. 
Because the Court has failed to conceptualize special legislation as a 
category of law deserving scrutiny because of its particularized effect, it 
is perhaps not surprising that scholars have failed to provide a robust 
constitutional theory that would protect against special legislation.  
There are three main lines of scholarship addressing special legislation: 
equal protection, state constitutional restrictions, and individual 
substantive legal areas.  Although each of these lines of scholarship 
addresses some aspects of the problem of special legislation, each fails to 
provide an approach that connects the text of the Constitution with the 
historical experiences of the generation that framed that text and with 
the philosophical traditions that gave rise to it.  The principle introduced 
in this Article contributes to a lively but unresolved debate over 
constitutional restraints on special legislation by offering an approach 
that is based on the text of the Constitution, its philosophical 
underpinnings, and the history leading up to its framing.  
Scholars seeking to articulate federal constitutional restrictions on 
special legislation primarily advocate an expansive reading of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.112  A number of 
scholars have argued that the Equal Protection Clause should be read 
more broadly than an anti-discrimination device, instead focusing on the 
clause’s potential to eliminate all class-based distinctions.113  Professor 
Balkin, for example, has argued that the Equal Protection Clause should 
be read to prohibit “class legislation,” codifying a pre-Civil War idea 
that “‘special’ or ‘partial’ legislation that picked out a group for special 
benefits or special burdens” violated principles of equality.114  Professor 
Balkin’s argument is closely related to work by Professors Saunders and 
Nourse, who connect the Equal Protection Clause with the antebellum 
 
112.  Eskridge, supra note 19, at 1246–47; Saunders, supra note 17, at 288–90; see also 
Balkin, supra note 18, at 315–16; Goldberg, supra note 19, at 528–30; Nourse & Maguire, 
supra note 19, at 959–65, 995–96. 
113.  Eskridge, supra note 19, at 1246–47; Saunders, supra note 17, at 254–55; see also 
Goldberg, supra note 19, at 528–30; Nourse & Maguire, supra note 19, at 959–65, 995–96; 
Balkin, supra note 18, at 315–16. 
114.  Balkin, supra note 18, at 315. 
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tradition that citizens are entitled to be governed by general, as opposed 
to special, laws.115  As Professor Saunders describes, in the decades 
leading up the ratification of the Equal Protection Clause, special laws 
were considered offensive because they benefitted one individual or 
group at the expense of the rest of the population, undermining equality 
and fostering faction and corruption.116  Although this line of scholarship 
does provide a link between the American aversion to special legislation 
and a clause of the Constitution, it fails to connect this aversion to the 
numerous provisions in the Constitution other than the Equal 
Protection Clause that demonstrate a commitment to the limitation of 
special laws, including, most importantly, the Bill of Attainder, Title of 
Nobility, and Ex Post Facto Clauses.  It also fails to connect the text of 
the Constitution to the historical experiences that gave rise to the 
inclusion of all of these clauses in the Constitution. 
A second line of scholarship focuses on state constitutional 
restrictions on special legislation.  Professor Long has argued that 
interpretations of state constitutional provisions restricting special 
legislation defer to the legislature in imitation of weak federal 
protections under the Equal Protection Clause.117  Professor Long 
argues that the incorporation of equal protection jurisprudence into 
state special legislation doctrine, and the resulting deference to state 
legislatures, is unnecessary.  Somewhat in tension with Professors 
Balkin, Nourse, and Saunders, Professor Long argues that the concerns 
motivating the ratification of the Equal Protection Clause differed from 
those motivating state constitutional restrictions on special legislation.  
As a result, he argues, state courts should be free to interpret their state 
constitutional provisions independently of, and potentially more broadly 
than, federal Equal Protection doctrine.118  Because this line of 
scholarship focuses on the historical backdrop to state constitutional 
provisions that address special legislation, it is inadequate to address the 
problem of special legislation enacted by Congress.  It also fails to take 
into account the many provisions of the federal Constitution that 
address special laws and the historical backdrop that precipitated their 
inclusion in the document’s text. 
A third line of scholarship has identified the individual clauses of the 
 
115.  Nourse & Maguire, supra note 19, at 959–65; Saunders, supra note 17, at 252–53. 
116.  Saunders, supra note 17, at 252–55. 
117.  Long, supra note 26, at 742; see also Rubin, supra note 18, at 405. 
118.  See Long, supra note 26, at 742–43. 
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Constitution that are well-suited to address the problem of special 
legislation.  Based on one or more of these clauses, these scholars have 
suggested an expanded role for courts reviewing special laws.119  For 
example, scholars interpreting the Bill of Attainder Clauses have argued 
that they best can be viewed as a way to prohibit laws that impose a 
variety of disabilities on known, identifiable groups.120  Other scholars 
have suggested that the Title of Nobility Clauses might restrict the 
government from participating in the private development and 
distribution of “biological benefits,” such as “organ transplants, life 
extension, [and] cloning,”121 or prohibit states from granting special 
consideration to legacy candidates for admission to public universities.122  
In the realm of spending, a number of scholars have argued that the 
general welfare restriction on the Spending Clause could be used by 
courts to police special spending legislation more aggressively.123  Others 
view immigration as a special case, noting that special immigration 
statutes, but probably not other types of special legislation, are 
prohibited by the Constitution.124  Although this line of scholarship does 
reflect the many clauses of the Constitution that relate to special 
 
119.  See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, “Democratic Despotism” and Constitutional Constraint: 
An Empirical Analysis of Ex Post Facto Claims in State Courts, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
439, 498–99 (2004); Robert G. Natelson, Statutory Retroactivity: The Founders’ View, 39 
IDAHO L. REV. 489, 523, 529 (2003); Laura Ricciardi & Michael B.W. Sinclair, Retroactive 
Civil Legislation, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 301, 376–77 (1996). 
120.  Mark Strasser, Ex Post Facto Laws, Bills of Attainder, and the Definition of 
Punishment: On DOMA, the Hawaii Amendment, and Federal Constitutional Constraints, 48 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 227, 228 (1998).  Other commentators have argued that the Bill of 
Attainder Clause is best understood as a shield for political activity otherwise protected by 
the First Amendment, Thomas B. Griffith, Note, Beyond Process: A Substantive Rationale for 
the Bill of Attainder Clause, 70 VA. L. REV. 475, 476 (1984), or a guarantee of neutral judicial 
process, Jane Welsh, Note, The Bill of Attainder Clause: An Unqualified Guarantee of 
Process, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 77, 80 (1983). 
121.  Delgado, supra note 94, at 101, 127.  Professor Delgado describes that the Court’s 
equal protection cases limiting certain types of state-sponsored giving seem to “result in 
invalidation of programs that confer benefits permanently and unreviewably; that establish 
groups apt to be perceived as privileged or ‘special’; and that create closed classes.”  Id. at 
106. 
122.  Carlton F.W. Larson, Titles of Nobility, Hereditary Privilege, and the 
Unconstitutionality of Legacy Preferences in Public School Admissions, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1375 (2006). 
123.  See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 98, at 356–57; Robert G. Natelson, Judicial Review 
of Special Interest Spending: The General Welfare Clause and the Fiduciary Law of the 
Founders, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 239, 274–76 (2007); see also Lynn A. Baker, The Spending 
Power and the Federalist Revival, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 195, 198 (2001). 
124.  Pfander & Wardon, supra note 99, at 399. 
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legislation, by emphasizing only one or more clauses individually, it fails 
to identify the coherent principle that animates all of these clauses.  
Moreover, it fails to recognize the historical circumstances and 
philosophical traditions that link these clauses to one another. 
This Article contributes to the three lines of scholarship noted 
above, which focus alternately on the Equal Protection Clause, state 
constitutional provisions, and individual substantive areas of law, by 
articulating a robust and coherent constitutional principle restraining 
special legislation.  The principle restraining special legislation 
articulated in this Article has its foundations in the history of the 
framing of the Constitution, the text of the Constitution itself, and the 
philosophical traditions underpinning the Constitution.  As a result, the 
principle articulated in this Article offers a number of contributions to 
the existing literature.  It makes sense of under-enforced, but 
undoubtedly important, clauses of the Constitution; it connects these 
constitutional clauses with the historical backdrop and philosophical 
principles that motivated their inclusion in the Constitution; it applies 
coherently across different substantive areas of law; and it applies 
seamlessly both to state legislatures and Congress.  This principle, the 
constitutional value of legislative generality, is described in Part IV, 
below. 
IV. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE VALUE OF LEGISLATIVE GENERALITY 
Both Congress and state legislatures routinely enact special 
legislation, and neither the Supreme Court nor scholars have articulated 
a principle requiring courts to exercise coherent and meaningful judicial 
review over it.  Nevertheless, a value that disfavors special legislation 
should be enforced as an independent constitutional principle.  This 
principle, which may be called the value of legislative generality,125 is 
supported by three distinct, but related, pillars—history, constitutional 
text, and philosophical considerations.  First, the history of the 
revolutionary period leading up to the framing of the Constitution 
suggests that a key purpose of the Constitution was to address evils 
associated with special legislation.  Second, the Constitution contains a 
number of under-enforced clauses that, when read together and in 
context, delineate a norm of legislative generality.  Third, an 
 
125.  This principle, and its connection to the Bill of Attainder, Ex Post Facto, Title of 
Nobility, and Contract Clauses, was introduced in Zoldan, supra note 96, at 207–08. 
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interpretation of the Constitution that includes a value of legislative 
generality fits well with a number of philosophical traditions and leads 
to normatively attractive results.  Together, these pillars support the 
conclusion that legislative generality is a value with constitutional 
weight and suggest that current constitutional doctrine should be 
modified to give effect to this value.  Each of these three pillars will be 
sketched briefly in this Part.  Part V will fully articulate the historical 
basis for the value of legislative generality.  The other two pillars—the 
text of the Constitution and philosophical and normative 
considerations—will be fully articulated in later work. 
A. The Historical Basis for a Value of Legislative Generality 
Modern special laws, including the special detriment and special 
benefit laws described above, strongly resemble special legislation 
enacted during the colonial and revolutionary periods.  Members of the 
revolutionary generation suffered from special legislation enacted by 
Parliament and, in the years after independence, by their own state 
legislatures.  This special legislation came in the form of special 
detriment legislation, like bills of attainder126 and laws confiscating 
property.127  It also came in the form of special benefit legislation, 
including laws immunizing named individuals from civil suit,128 nullifying 
judgments already rendered against them,129 providing immunity from 
criminal prosecution,130 and granting legislative divorces.131 
 
126.  See CHAFEE, supra note 66, at 93; WOOD, supra note 66, at 279; Comment, supra 
note 66, at 330–31. 
127.  E.g., An Act to Compel Non-Residents to Return Within a Certain Time or in 
Default Thereof, That Their Estates Be Confiscated, and for Confiscating the Estate of 
William Knox, Esq. Formerly Provost Marshal, of the Then Province, Now State of Georgia 
(1778), in 19 (pt. 2) THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 126, 126–27 
(Allen D. Chandler ed., 1911); An Act to Confiscate the Estates of Sundry Persons Therein 
Named, ch. 19 (1778), in 4 LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 191, 191–93 (Henry Harrison Metcalf 
ed., 1916); An Act to Confiscate the Estates of Certain Notorious Conspirators Against the 
Government and Liberties of the Inhabitants of the Late Province, Now State, of 
Massachusetts Bay, ch. 48 (1778), in 5 THE ACTS AND RESOLVES, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, OF 
THE PROVINCE OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY 966, 966–67 (Boston, Wright & Potter 
Printing Co. 1886) [hereinafter ACTS AND RESOLVES OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY].  In 
many cases, the confiscations were directed at Tories, who also saw their ability to practice 
their professions curtailed by opportunistic Whig legislatures.  BAILYN, supra note 61, at 302; 
LEVY, supra note 61, at 71; Trent, supra note 61, at 454. 
128.  E.g., Mortimer v. Caldwell, 1 Kirby 53, 54 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1786); VERMONT 
REPORT, supra note 72, at 60–70. 
129.  VERMONT REPORT, supra note 72, at 60–70; see also Timothy A. Lawrie, 
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Wearied by a decade of special laws, and recalling the history of 
abusive special legislation enacted by Parliament, the revolutionary 
generation ultimately rejected special legislation, denouncing state 
legislatures for “extending their deliberations to the cases of 
individuals.”132  They rejected all manner of special laws, including those 
“amend[ing] titles to land,” “dissolving . . . the bonds of marriage,” 
attainting suspects of crimes, granting state benefits to citizens,133 and 
deciding pending legal disputes.134  The revolutionary generation 
rejected the power of the legislature to declare named individuals 
ineligible for the protections of the standing laws.135  Popular opinion 
disclaimed the right of the legislature “to give monopolies of legal 
privilege—to bestow unequal portions of our common inheritance on 
favourites.”136  By the close of the confederation period, both special 
privileges and special detriments were considered “repugnant to the 
spirit of the American republics.”137  It was with these experiences, and 
in large part driven by them, that the framers of the Constitution arrived 
in Philadelphia in 1787.138 
 
Interpretation and Authority: Separation of Powers and the Judiciary’s Battle for Independence 
in New Hampshire, 1786–1818, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 310, 315 (1995). 
130.  E.g., VERMONT REPORT, supra note 72, at 70. 
131.  E.g., id. at 60. 
132.  COUNCIL OF CENSORS, A REPORT [hereinafter PENNSYLVANIA REPORT], in THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 35, 38 (Philadelphia, Francis 
Bailey 1784). 
133.  Id. at 41, 46–48, 57, 59. 
134.  Id. at 40. 
135.  See The Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia on the 
Adoption of the Federal Constitution [hereinafter Convention of Virginia], in 3 THE DEBATES 
IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 1, 66–67 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES].  
136.  WOOD, supra note 66, at 402 (quoting DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF PENNSYLVANIA 130 (Mathew Carey ed., 1786) [hereinafter 
PENNSYLVANIA DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS]) (internal quotation marks omitted); George 
P. Smith, II, Dr. Bonham’s Case and the Modern Significance of Lord Coke’s Influence, 41 
WASH. L. REV. 297, 304–05 (1966) (noting that Coke believed that all monopolies were 
rendered unlawful by the Magna Charta). 
137.  WOOD, supra note 66, at 401; James Madison, Title for the President (May 11, 
1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 154, 155–56 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. 
Rutland eds., 1979). 
138.  Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 220–21 (1995); EDWARD S. CORWIN, 
THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 36–37, 62 (Peter Smith 1963) (1914) [hereinafter 
CORWIN, DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW]; EDWARD S. CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND 
THE CONSTITUTION 148–50 (1919) [hereinafter CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE 
CONSTITUTION]; EDWARD S. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 70–71 (1948) 
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B. The Textual Support for a Value of Legislative Generality. 
The text of the Constitution memorializes the aversion to special 
legislation, and the commitment to the value of legislative generality, 
that the framers of the Constitution developed through hard experience 
during the confederation period.  Much like the principles of separation 
of powers139 or the right to privacy,140 the value of legislative generality is 
not found in any single clause of the Constitution in isolation.  Rather, 
the value can be gleaned by reading a number of related clauses of the 
Constitution together.  These clauses, covering subject matters as 
diverse as public records, immigration, and criminal law, together 
suggest a constitutional norm of legislative generality.  In particular, the 
Bill of Attainder, Ex Post Facto, and Title of Nobility Clauses, all of 
which restrain both Congress as well as state legislatures, embody a 
value of legislative generality and properly may be called the “generality 
clauses” of the Constitution. 
Among the generality clauses, the Bill of Attainder Clauses141 most 
explicitly address the practice of singling out individuals or small groups 
for special treatment.  Reflecting the recognition that the legislature, 
unrestrained by precedent, reason, or rules of evidence, can punish 
individuals for running afoul of the popular will,142 the clauses prevent 
the majority from burdening individuals unable to protect themselves 
through normal political processes.  The clauses restrict both the state 
legislatures and Congress from singling out an individual or small, 
known group for special detriments like death, banishment, the 
confiscation of property, and exclusion from one’s profession.143 
The Title of Nobility Clauses144 are the mirror image of the Bill of 
Attainder Clauses, supporting the value of legislative generality by 
prohibiting both Congress and state legislatures from granting certain 
special benefits to individuals or small, determinable groups.  Certainly, 
 
[hereinafter CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT]. 
139.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976) (per curiam) (holding that the principle of 
separation of powers is “woven” into the Constitution and can be discerned by reading 
together a number of the Constitution’s clauses). 
140.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (although the “Constitution does not 
explicitly mention any right of privacy,” this right can be gleaned from reading a number of 
provisions of the Constitution). 
141.  U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9–10. 
142.  United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441–42 (1965). 
143.  See id.  
144.  U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9–10. 
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the clauses prohibit the granting of literal titles, like “dukes, marquesses, 
earls, viscounts and barons.”145  However, in light of the manifold legal 
and economic privileges that are associated with the English nobility,146 
a more plausible reading of the clauses includes preventing the 
establishment of both a literal titled nobility, as well as a functional 
nobility imbued with these special privileges. 
The Ex Post Facto Clauses operate as a check against special 
legislation by preventing the legislature from doing indirectly what it 
cannot do directly because of the Bill of Attainder or Title of Nobility 
Clauses.  When a legislature enacts retroactive legislation, it acts with 
the knowledge of conduct that already has occurred.  As a result, the 
ability to enact retroactive legislation permits the legislature to punish 
or benefit an individual without naming him specifically but with the 
knowledge of whom the legislation will benefit or harm.147  The case of 
Harry Bridges is an explicit, but far from unique, example of the use of a 
retrospective law to single out an individual for punishment.  Amidst 
anti-Communist fervor, the United States House of Representatives 
passed a special bill directing the deportation of Harry Bridges.148  When 
it became clear that the special law would be considered an 
unconstitutional bill of attainder, a new bill was introduced that did not 
use Bridges’s name specifically but retroactively made his conduct a 
deportable offense.149  Removing all doubt about the intent of the 
retroactive law, the author of the second bill introduced it in the 
following way: “It is my joy to announce that this bill will do . . . what 
the bill specifically aimed at the deportation of Harry Bridges seeks to 
accomplish.  This bill changes the law so that the Department of Justice 
should now have little trouble in deporting Harry Bridges.”150  The 
second bill, designed to reach the conduct of a particular individual, 
 
145.  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 303 
(Wayne Morrison ed., Cavendish Publ’g 2001). 
146.  Id. at 390.  These special privileges include the freedom from arrest for civil cases, 
privileges in judicial proceedings, and the freedom from being subjected to judgment by a jury 
made up of commoners.  Id.  
147.  Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive 
Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692, 693 (1960). 
148.  H.R. 9766, 76th CONG. (3d Sess. 1940); Roberts, supra note 71, at 1387; see, e.g., 
Comment, In re Harry Bridges, 52 YALE L.J. 108, 109–10 (1942). 
149.  Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 158 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring) (“As a 
substitute for this direct legislative assault upon Bridges, Congress amended the deportation 
law” to reach him indirectly.). 
150.  86 CONG. REC. 9031 (1940). 
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became the law, leading to the institution of deportation proceedings 
against Bridges.151  As the Bridges case elucidates, the prohibition of 
retrospective laws, a right protected by the Ex Post Facto Clauses, 
prevents the legislature from making an end-run around the Bill of 
Attainder and Title of Nobility Clauses to benefit or harm known 
individuals.  Perhaps not surprisingly, during the republic’s early years, 
the Ex Post Facto Clauses were viewed as the primary constitutional 
source for the prevention of special legislation.152 
The connection among the generality clauses, and the fact that they 
all address different aspects of the same problem of special legislation, is 
reflected in early cases that defined them.  Describing the connection 
among the generality clauses in Ogden v. Saunders, the Court held that 
the “collocation” of these clauses together, in Article I, Section 10 of the 
Constitution, reveals that these clauses are “members of the same family 
brought together in the most intimate connexion with each other.”153  
They must be read together because the “spirit and motives of these 
prohibitions . . . agree in the principle which suggested them.”154  The 
principle alluded to in Saunders was made explicitly in Fletcher v. Peck, 
in which Chief Justice Marshall opined, “It is the peculiar province of 
the legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of society; 
the application of those rules to individuals in society would seem to be 
the duty of other departments.”155 
In addition to the Bill of Attainder, Title of Nobility, and Ex Post 
Facto Clauses, which most specifically disfavor special laws, the 
Constitution also contains a number of other clauses that imply a norm 
of generality in legislation.  For example, the Appointments Clause 
denies Congress the right to exercise the power of appointment of 
officers that was so abused by the state legislatures during the 
confederation period.156  Other constitutional clauses that suggest a 
 
151.  Bridges, 326 U.S. at 158–59 (Murphy, J., concurring). 
152.  CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 138, at 148–50.  
Congress was far from innovative in using retrospective laws to reach an individual who could 
not be punished through the normal legal processes.  In England, Parliament used 
retrospective laws in order to punish public ministers who had run afoul of Parliament’s 
graces but committed no illegal act.  CHAFEE, supra note 66, at 111–13. 
153.  Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 265–66 (1827). 
154.  Id. at 267. 
155.  Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810) (emphasis added). 
156.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; WOOD, supra, note 66, at 145; 2 FARRAND, supra 
note 1, at 314–15. 
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norm of legislative generality include the General Welfare,157 
Naturalization,158 and Bankruptcy Clauses,159 all of which suggest that 
Congress’s power to enact legislation in these areas is limited to uniform 
laws.  Constitutional amendments, too, including the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause, suggest a norm of legislative generality. 
In conclusion, although the Constitution contains no single clause 
that guarantees that state legislatures and Congress will enact only 
generally applicable laws, a number of clauses, when read together, 
suggest that one of the goals of the Constitution is the avoidance of 
legislative specification.  In future work, I will further elaborate on the 
textual basis for the value of legislative generality, focusing on the 
clauses most well-suited to support a value of legislative generality. 
C. The Philosophical Underpinnings of a Value of Legislative 
Generality 
It is not surprising that the text of the Constitution and the history 
leading up to its framing support a value of legislative generality; 
indeed, there is a long tradition among jurists and philosophers of law 
that excludes special legislation from the definition of law and 
recognizes legislative generality as a normatively attractive value.  
Traditionally, scholars and philosophers of law drew a sharp distinction 
between rules that apply to the population generally and rules that 
apply only to a single individual.  William Blackstone160 and John 
Locke161 argued that a rule that applies to a single individual simply falls 
outside the definition of “law.”  Blackstone reasoned that an act of the 
legislature must be “universal” to qualify as a law; if it applies to one 
 
157.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  See also The Preamble to the United States 
Constitution, which declares that a purpose of the union of the states is to “promote the 
general welfare.” 
158.  Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
159.  Id. 
160.  Blackstone’s Commentaries, widely read by educated members of the 
revolutionary period, “undoubtedly influenced American thinking” about legislative power.  
CHAFEE, supra note 66, at 95–96; see also CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT, supra 
note 138, at 54. 
161.  John Locke’s writings on natural rights and the social contract were cited in 
“pamphlet after pamphlet” by American writers of the revolutionary generation.  BAILYN, 
supra note 61, at 27.  Locke was studied by James Wilson and was quoted in influential 
reports written by the Pennsylvania Council of Censors and the Vermont Council of Censors.  
PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 132, at 37; VERMONT REPORT, supra note 72, at 63. 
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person alone, it “has no relation to the community in general” and is 
therefore “rather a sentence than a law.”162  Locke agreed, arguing that, 
even to be considered a law, a rule must be “common to every one of 
that society”;163 the legislature therefore was constrained to promulgate 
“one rule for rich and poor, for the favourite at court, and the country 
man at plough.”164 
Modern philosophers of law have adopted and reasserted this basic 
principle that the definition of law simply does not include orders to 
individuals.  Lon Fuller describes generality in law as a precondition to 
the existence of a legal system.  In The Morality of Law, in order to 
elucidate the features of legality, Fuller describes the ways in which an 
attempt at lawmaking may fail.165  Fuller argues that the first and most 
obvious failure of a legal system is the inability to promulgate general 
rules of conduct.  Because it fails to provide notice to guide future 
conduct and fails to uphold the expectations of those who are bound by 
it, even a perfectly fair and equitable system of adjudication cannot 
properly be called a legal system in the absence of generally applicable 
laws.  As a result, Fuller calls the generality of law the “first desideratum 
of a system for subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules.”166 
Moreover, scholars assessing the normative implications of special 
legislation conclude that they are immoral and lead to a variety of 
societal harms.  Cicero described laws that single out an individual for 
special treatment, even laws that confer special benefits, as “unjust.”167  
David Hume168 was particularly critical of laws that exempted the 
powerful of society from the general applicability of the laws.169  
 
162.  1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 145, at 33. 
163.  JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 22 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 
Hackett Publ’g Co. 1980). 
164.  Id. § 142. 
165.  FULLER, supra note 2, at 46–48. 
166.  Id. at 46. 
167.  CICERO, supra note 3, at 173. 
168.  David Hume’s writings strongly influenced, among others, Wilson, Madison, and 
Hamilton.  JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION 
60–61 (2000) (Hamilton); Douglas Adair, “That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science”: David 
Hume, James Madison, and The Tenth Federalist, 20 HUNTINGTON LIBR. Q. 343, 346–49 
(1957) (Madison); William Ewald, James Wilson and the Drafting of the Constitution, 10 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 901, 902–04 (2008) (Wilson). 
169.  DAVID HUME, Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences, in POLITICAL 
ESSAYS 58, 62–63 (Knud Haakonssen ed., 1994). 
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Algernon Sidney170 went even further, arguing that the liberty of 
England’s Saxon ancestors was predicated on the requirement that 
legislators could not exempt themselves from the generally applicable 
laws.171 
Ultimately, the consistency with which special laws have been 
condemned, and the repeated articulation of a value of legislative 
generality by philosophers of law, is no doubt closely linked to the 
harms associated with special legislation and the normative benefits that 
will result from its diminution.  The value of legislative generality is 
normatively attractive because the power to enact special laws is closely 
linked with corruption,172 the unequal treatment of similar cases,173 the 
failure to reform broken statutory schemes,174 encroachment on the 
judicial function,175 and a host of other harms. 
To take just one example of a harm closely associated with special 
laws, special legislation long has been linked to quid pro quo corruption.  
In the notorious “Abscam” scandal, a number of Congressmen were 
implicated in a scheme to introduce special legislation in exchange for 
bribes.176  In the Abscam investigation, FBI agents claimed to represent 
two wealthy Arab sheiks who desired to immigrate to the United 
States.177  The agents met a number of federal officials, including United 
States Congressmen, who promised to introduce private immigration 
 
170.  Algernon Sidney, a republican theorist and opponent of monarchical influence in 
England, was widely read by the Framers and was quoted by Joseph Story in his 
Commentaries on the Constitution.  2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 36–37 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991).  Sidney’s 
writings also helped the colonists, inexperienced at nation-building, ground their increasingly 
radical politics in political philosophy.  BAILYN, supra note 61, at 34–35, 53–54. 
171.  ALGERNON SIDNEY, DISCOURSES CONCERNING GOVERNMENT 569–72 (Thomas 
G. West ed., LibertyClassics 1990). 
172.  CHARLES CHAUNCEY BINNEY, RESTRICTIONS UPON LOCAL AND SPECIAL 
LEGISLATION IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 6 (Philadelphia, Kay & Brother 1894). 
173.  See, e.g., Terri’s Law, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005). 
174.  E.g., Priv. L. No. 111-2, 124 Stat. 4525 (2010); Priv. L. No. 111-1, 124 Stat. 4523 
(2010); Priv. L. No. 108-6, 118 Stat. 4032 (2004); Priv. L. No. 108-4, 118 Stat. 4028 (2004); Priv. 
L. No. 108-3, 118 Stat. 4026 (2004); Priv. L. No. 108-1, 118 Stat. 4023 (2004); Priv. L. No. 107-
5, 116 Stat. 3123 (2002); Priv. L. No. 107-1, 115 Stat. 2471 (2001) (all granting exemptions 
from the Immigration and Nationality Act). 
175.  E.g., Mt. Soledad Veterans Memorial Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 109-272, § 2, 
120 Stat. 770, 770–72 (2006). 
176.  Bennett L. Gershman, Abscam, the Judiciary, and the Ethics of Entrapment, 91 
YALE L.J. 1565, 1571–72 (1982). 
177.  Id. 
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legislation to allow the fictitious sheiks to immigrate to the United 
States without having to comply with the generally applicable 
immigration laws.178  In all, twenty-five people, including one United 
States Senator and six United States Representatives, were indicted for 
corruption related to the Abscam investigation.179  The bribery at issue 
in the Abscam scandal was only possible because of the power of the 
legislature to enact special laws.  Because Congress is permitted to 
admit individual aliens in derogation of the standing immigration laws, a 
market exists for individuals to influence—and in this case bribe—
members of Congress to introduce bills to provide them with special 
legislative treatment.  A value of legislative generality that prohibits the 
legislature from providing special laws would eliminate this type of 
bribery by eliminating the supply of special legislative favors that can be 
bought. 
Of course, whether a value of special legislation is normatively 
attractive depends on whether it can be applied in a way that eliminates 
harmful special legislation without creating other undesired results.  The 
value of legislative generality articulated by jurists and philosophers of 
law leaves open a few key questions: Must a law apply to everyone to be 
sufficiently general?  Should a legislature be prohibited from enacting 
special laws if only the effect, but not the intent, is to confer special 
treatment?  Should there be any exceptions for curative laws or 
emergency situations?  The scope of this Article precludes a thorough 
evaluation of normative arguments about the desirability of special 
legislation in limited circumstances.  In future work, I will describe the 
harms created by special legislation and evaluate the extent to which 
some special legislation can be justified on normative grounds. 
Taken together, the historical, textual, and philosophical arguments 
outlined in this Part support the conclusion that a value of legislative 
generality should be recognized as an enforceable constitutional value.  
Each of these three pillars warrants further elaboration.  The textual 
support and philosophical underpinnings will be addressed in future 
 
178.  United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1225 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d 692 F.2d 823 
(2d Cir. 1982); Gershman, supra note 176, at 1572–75. 
179.  Gershman, supra note 176, at 1575; see also LEE, supra note 27, at 9 (“Abscam, 
involving payoffs for the sponsorship of private immigration laws, culminated in the expulsion 
of one Member of the House of Representatives . . . .”).  Corruption related to private laws 
has existed in the context of private bills since before the ratification of the Constitution.  
Pfander & Wardon, supra note 99, at 431. 
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work; the principal subject of this Article, the historical basis for the 
value of legislative generality, is articulated in Part V, below. 
V. THE HISTORICAL BASIS FOR A VALUE OF LEGISLATIVE 
GENERALITY 
The Constitution’s structure and provisions were informed not only 
by logic and political philosophy, but also, and perhaps most directly, by 
the experiences of the revolutionary generation in the years leading up 
to the framing of the Constitution.180  A thorough understanding of the 
revolutionary period, therefore, can inform our understanding of the 
conditions that gave rise to the Constitution’s text and help guide, even 
if it does not compel, our interpretation of this text.  Reviewing the 
history of this period strongly suggests that the Constitution was 
designed, in part, to remedy evils associated with special legislation.   
Before independence, colonial Americans viewed their legislatures 
as the protectors of their liberties against abuses by the royal governors 
and judges, who were representatives of the monarchy and seen to 
represent the monarchy’s interests.181  The people viewed their state 
legislatures as the institutional descendants of Parliament,182 which, since 
its protracted battle for sovereignty with the British Crown,183 had been 
considered the protector of the rights of the people.184  Indeed, because 
the people placed so much trust in their legislatures, by the time of the 
revolution, the notion of “tyranny by the people was theoretically 
inconceivable.”185  It was only natural then that in the years immediately 
after the revolution the people of the United States emphasized their 
 
180.  CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 138, at 147–50.  
Although Justice Holmes described the development of the common law when he wrote that 
“[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience,” the adage applies perhaps 
with equal force to constitutional law.  OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON 
LAW 1 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2009).  
181.  BAILYN, supra note 61, at 163–64; CORWIN, DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, 
supra note 138, at 35; WOOD, supra note 66, at 598. 
182.  CORWIN, DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 138, at 36. 
183.  Id. at 28–29.  After the Glorious Revolution, the view that Parliament could create 
as well as implement law gained ascendancy.  BAILYN, supra note 61, at 201.  Through 
Blackstone’s writings, this view was transmitted to the American colonies.  CHAFEE, supra 
note 66, at 95–96. 
184.  BAILYN, supra note 61, at 285–86.  Of the House of Commons, Thomas Paine 
wrote that on its “virtue depends the freedom of England.”  Id. (quoting THOMAS PAINE, 
COMMON SENSE 5 (Peter Eckler Publ’g. 1918)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
185.  WOOD, supra note 66, at 62. 
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freedom from monarchical rule by structuring their new state 
governments to exalt rather than to restrain legislative power.186  In the 
spate of constitution-making that occurred after the revolution, the 
states focused on ensuring that the legislatures represented the will of 
the people and did not consider the dangers of unchecked democracy.187  
State constitutions elevated the position of their legislatures to the 
detriment, almost to the exclusion, of their executive and judicial 
branches.188  By failing to recognize the potential for abuse by the 
people, the revolutionary generation laid the institutional foundation for 
the runaway legislative abuses of the confederation period.189 
Ultimately, the unbridled legislative power unleashed after the 
revolution introduced the people of the United States to the dangers of 
special legislation.  After a decade of experiencing the harms 
precipitated by the power to make special laws, both elite and ordinary 
members of the revolutionary generation denounced special legislation 
and articulated a value of legislative generality.  Indeed, there was 
perhaps no factor that more directly motivated the calling of the 
Philadelphia Convention than the recognition, after this first, long 
decade of independence, of the evils that result from unchecked 
legislative power to enact special laws.190 
A. Special Legislation in Confederation-Era America 
The legislative abuses wrought by the revolutionary generation came 
largely in the form of special legislation.191  The new state legislatures, 
unrestrained by their constitutions or coordinate branches of 
government, and emboldened by the ideology that the will of the people 
alone—for the first time unencumbered by Crown or Nobles—was 
 
186.  CORWIN, DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 138, at 35–36; see THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 309–10 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
187.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 186, at 309–10 (James Madison). 
188.  CORWIN, DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 138, at 36–37; see THE 
FEDERALIST NOS. 48–49, supra note 186, at 309–10, 313 (James Madison). 
189.  See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 48–49, supra note 186, at 309–10, 313 (James 
Madison). 
190.  Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 220–21 (1995); CORWIN, DOCTRINE 
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 138, at 36–37, 62; CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 138, at 148–50; CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT, 
supra note 138, at 70–71. 
191.  WOOD, supra note 66, at 155–56, 191–95, 279, 404; CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST 
GOVERNMENT, supra note 138, at 70–71. 
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sovereign, routinely enacted special laws.192  These special laws enacted 
by the revolutionary generation both imposed special detriments and 
provided special benefits. 
1. Special Detriment Legislation 
The history of the early republic is replete with stories of special 
detriment legislation.  Most well-known are the countless bills of 
attainder, in which suspected Tories193 or other social undesirables194 
were singled out by statute and sentenced to death or banishment by 
their state legislatures without judicial process.195  The motivation for 
these attainders varied.  In some cases, the legislatures desired to 
confiscate property.196  In one case, a tavern keeper was threatened with 
banishment for allegedly insulting a legislator, a credible threat in that 
climate of legislative omnipotence.197  The Virginia Assembly’s stated 
purpose in attainting Josiah Philips and his gang was to avoid “the 
delays which would attend the proceeding to outlaw the said offenders, 
according to the usual forms and procedures of the courts of law.”198  
Summarizing the mood of Virginia’s legislature at the time of the 
attainder of Philips, Patrick Henry defended the decision: Philips, 
declared Henry, was not entitled to “beautiful legal ceremonies” 
because it was well-known that he was “a fugitive murderer and an 
 
192.  Plaut, 514 U.S. at 219–21; PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 132, at 40–59; 
VERMONT REPORT, supra note 72, at 60–70; CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT, 
supra note 138, at 70–71. 
193.  Respublica v. Gordon, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 233 (Pa. 1788); An Act for Disposing of 
Certain Estates, and Banishing Certain Persons, Therein Mentioned, no. 1153 (1782), in 4 
THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 516, 516–17 (Thomas Cooper ed., 
Columbia, A.S. Johnston 1838); CHAFEE, supra note 66, at 97; LEVY, supra note 61, at 71–72. 
194.  E.g., An Act to Attaint Josiah Phillips and Others, Unless They Render 
Themselves to Justice Within a Certain Time, ch. 12 (1778), in 9 STATUTES AT LARGE OF 
VIRGINIA, supra note 68, at 463–64; Trent, supra note 61, at 444–54. 
195.  See CHAFEE, supra note 66, at 93; WOOD, supra note 66, at 279; Comment, supra 
note 66, at 330–31. 
196.  E.g., An Act In Addition to an Act Intituled “An Act to Confiscate the Estates of 
Sundry Persons Therein Named,” ch. 8 (1779), in 4 LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, supra note 
127, at 216, 216–18; CHAFEE, supra note 66, at 93; LEVY, supra note 61, at 70–71, Trent, supra 
note 61, at 454. 
197.  WOOD, supra note 66, at 367. 
198.  An Act to Attaint Josiah Phillips and Others, Unless They Render Themselves to 
Justice Within a Certain Time, ch. 12, in 9 STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, supra note 68, 
at 463–64. 
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outlaw.”199  Philips deserved no legal process, Henry argued, because he 
had been no Socrates.200 
Bills of attainder were most commonly deployed to punish suspected 
but unproved Tories.201  Early during the War of Independence, the 
State of New York declared that certain named individuals were guilty 
of having “voluntarily been adherent” to George III and enacted a bill 
of attainder that forever banished them from the state.202  Should they 
later be found anywhere in the state, they were “adjudged and declared 
guilty of felony” without the benefit of indictment and trial and 
sentenced to “death as in cases of felony.”203  New York ultimately 
attainted nearly 1,000 people during the revolutionary period.204  
Similarly, during those heady days of freedom from colonial rule, the 
General Assembly of South Carolina confiscated property from, or 
levied fines on, nearly three hundred supposed, but unproved, Tories.205  
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Georgia, too, attainted 
suspected Tories by the hundreds.206  By the end of the revolutionary 
period, each of the newly independent states had enacted bills of 
attainder.207 
An air of opportunism surrounded the attainder of suspected Tories; 
in some cases the states confiscated Tory property for their own use,208 
 
199.  Convention of Virginia, supra note 135, at 140.  Thomas Jefferson himself was 
responsible for writing the bill attainting Philips and shepherding it through the Virginia 
Assembly.  LEVY, supra note 61, at 72. 
200.  Convention of Virginia, supra note 135, at 140. 
201.  LEVY, supra note 61, at 71–72. 
202.  An Act for the Forfeiture and Sale of the Estates of Persons Who Have Adhered 
to the Enemies of this State, and for Declaring the Sovereignty of the People of this State, in 
Respect to all Property Within the Same, ch. 25 (1779), in 1 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW 
YORK 26, 26–27 (Thomas Greenleaf ed., New York, 1792). 
203.  Id. at 27. 
204.  LEVY, supra note 61, at 71. 
205.  WOOD, supra note 66, at 279. 
206.  E.g., Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14 (1800); Respublica v. Gordon, 1 U.S. (1 
Dall.) 233 (Pa. 1788); Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 5–6 (1782); see also LEVY, 
supra note 61, at 71. 
207.  CORWIN, DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 138, at 72. 
208.  E.g., An Act to Compel Non-Residents to Return Within a Certain Time or in 
Default Thereof, That Their Estates Be Confiscated, and for Confiscating the Estate of 
William Knox, Esq. Formerly Provost Marshal, of the Then Province, Now State of Georgia 
(1778), in 19 (pt. 2) THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, supra note 127, 
at 126, 126–27; An Act to Confiscate the Estates of Sundry Persons Therein Named, ch. 19 
(1778), in 4 LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, supra note 127, at 191, 191–93; An Act to Confiscate 
the Estates of Certain Notorious Conspirators Against the Government and Liberties of the 
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and in others, they confiscated property in order to transfer it to another 
private party.209  Serving the dual interests of protecting Whigs from 
economic competition and preventing Tories from receiving fair legal 
representation, New Jersey and Pennsylvania barred Tory lawyers from 
practicing in their courts.210  In what may only be viewed as equally 
unfair play, the loyalist wing of some state legislatures attainted leaders 
of the rebellion during this period as well.211 
The revolutionary generation was well aware, too, of the long history 
of special detriment legislation enacted in Great Britain leading up to 
and during the colonial period.  In the century leading up to the 
American Revolution, bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties 
were common in England.212  As in America, British special laws were 
often directed at political undesirables and accompanied by forfeiture of 
property.213  One well-known example was the attainder of Thomas 
Wentworth, the Earl of Strafford.  Like the subsequent attainder of 
Philips in Virginia, Strafford was attainted as an expedient to obviate 
the normal legal processes.214  An adviser to Charles I, Strafford fell out 
of favor with Parliament because of his influence over the King.  
Parliament charged him with treason and began his trial before the 
House of Lords; during the trial, it became evident that Strafford had 
 
Inhabitants of the Late Province, Now State, of Massachusetts Bay, ch. 48 (1778), in 5 ACTS 
AND RESOLVES OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY, supra note 127, at 966–67.  In many cases, 
the confiscations were directed at Tories, who also saw their ability to practice their 
professions curtailed by opportunistic Whig legislatures.  LEVY, supra note 61, at 71; BAILYN, 
supra note 61, at 302; Trent, supra note 61, at 454. 
209.  PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 132, at 39–40. 
210.  LEVY, supra note 61, at 71. 
211.  E.g., An Act to Attaint of High Treason the Several Persons Herein After Named 
if They Do Not Render Themselves to Justice by a Certain Day and for Other Purposes 
Therein Mentioned (1781), in 1 THE REVOLUTIONARY RECORDS OF THE STATE OF 
GEORGIA 364, 364–70 (Allen D. Candler ed., Atlanta, Franklin-Turner Co. 1908). 
212.  E.g., An Act for the Attainder of the Pretended Prince of Wales of High Treason, 
1701, 13 & 14 Will. 3, c. 3, in 7 STATUTES OF THE REALM 739 (John Raithby ed., London, 
1820); An Act to Attaint Such of the Persons Concerned in the Late Horrid Conspiracy to 
Assassinate His Majesties Royal Person Who Are Fled from Justice Unless They Render 
Themselves to Justice and for Continuing Several Others of the Said Conspirators in Custody, 
1696–1697, 8 & 9 Will. 3, c. 5, in 7 STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra, at 165; An Act for 
Attainting Thomas Dolman Joseph Bampfield and Thomas Scott of High-Treason if They 
Render Not Themselves by a Day, 1665, 17 Car. 2, c. 5, in 5 STATUTES OF THE REALM 578 
(John Raithby ed., London, 1819); LEVY, supra note 61, at 69–70; Comment, supra note 66, at 
330–31. 
213.  CHAFEE, supra note 66, at 101–17; LEVY, supra note 61, at 68. 
214.  CHAFEE, supra note 66, at 109–13. 
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committed no act that could be called treason.  In order to accomplish 
by statute what it could not accomplish in a court of law, Parliament 
changed course, instead enacting a bill of attainder and sentencing 
Strafford to death.215 
2. Special Benefit Legislation 
Although statutes levying special detriments, like bills of attainder, 
are perhaps the best known of the special laws that plagued the new 
states, they are far from the only examples.  During the revolutionary 
period, states passed all manner of special benefit laws, including laws 
that provided legal, financial, and political benefits to named individuals 
or small, known groups.   
Among the most common laws providing special legal benefits were 
laws immunizing named individuals from civil suit,216 nullifying 
judgments already rendered against them,217 providing immunity from 
criminal prosecution, and granting legislative divorces.218  Parties to 
lawsuits, too, called on their state legislatures to intercede on their 
behalf in private disputes.219  At the behest of litigating parties, state 
legislatures enacted measures for the purpose of “setting aside court 
decisions, for suspending the general law for the benefit of named 
individuals . . . and even for deciding cases.”220  The legislatures, having 
usurped the role of the courts,221 unabashedly decided the “personal 
 
215.  Id. at 112–13. 
216.  E.g., Mortimer v. Caldwell, 1 Kirby 53, 54 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1786). 
217.  E.g., VERMONT REPORT, supra note 72, at 60–70; see also Lawrie, supra note 129, 
at 315. 
218.  E.g., VERMONT REPORT, supra note 72, at 60–70; Caldwell, 1 Kirby at 54–55. 
219.  Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219–21 (1995).  The arbitrariness with 
which the state legislatures rendered judgment on request from private parties calls to mind 
the abuses of the earliest days of the development of the writ system in England.  JOHN H. 
LANGBEIN, RENÉE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 90 (2009).  Although a 
party could go to the king to seek justice “more quickly than he could expect from the 
ordinary local courts,” the danger in this rough justice was “the utter lack of control.”  Id.  
Indeed, as a result of the expansion of the arbitrary rendering of decrees, “during many 
decades following 1066 abuse was made of this remedy, abuse which would in the course of 
time excite a reaction in favor of judicial guarantees.”  Id. 
220.  CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT, supra note 138, at 70; Plaut, 514 U.S. 
at 219–21; PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 132, at 40. 
221.  Madison described the legislature as the “vortex” into which all power of the 
government tends to be drawn.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 186, at 309 (James 
Madison). 
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affairs of their constituents in private law judgments.”222  Rather than 
providing extraordinary relief to ensure that justice was done, these 
special laws interfered with the “known established laws of the land” for 
the benefit of “private interests.”223  Often, the judgments rendered 
decided disputes brought by “one individual or group against another” 
without regard to the standing laws.224  The case of Mortimer v. 
Caldwell225 is illustrative.  Caldwell was one of two partners of a recently 
bankrupt business.  After the bankruptcy, Caldwell obtained a special 
law from the state legislature that exempted him from imprisonment for 
his inability to pay his debts.  Mortimer, a creditor of the bankrupt 
business, sued Caldwell to recover money owed to him by the defunct 
partnership.226  The court held that Caldwell was immune from suit 
because of the special law protecting him.227 
Similarly, special laws providing financial benefits were “wide 
ranging” during the revolutionary period.228  These special financial 
benefits included the transfer of public land and funds to private 
individuals229 and the legislative appointment to office.230  Some of the 
most controversial pieces of abusive special benefit legislation in the 
period leading up to the framing of the Constitution were special laws 
that provided monopoly rights to individual natural persons or 
corporations.  The grant of monopoly rights—state conferred exclusive 
privileges to engage in a particular trade231—were resented by 
Americans long before they rebelled against Great Britain.  Indeed, the 
 
222.  WOOD, supra note 66, at 156.  Although colonial legislatures, too, decided private 
rights, as did Parliament before them, the revolution “intensified legislative domination of the 
other parts of the government.”  Id. at 155. 
223.  Plaut, 514 U.S. at 220–21 (quoting Address of the Council of Censors (Feb. 14, 
1786), in VERMONT STATE PAPERS 531, 540 (William Slade ed., 1823)). 
224.  WOOD, supra note 66, at 154–55.  Extraordinary legal protections were also 
conferred on members of favored groups: as late as 1784, New Hampshire ratified a 
constitution that provided for the equal protection under the law for Christians only.  N.H. 
CONST. of 1784, pt. I, art. VI. 
225.  Mortimer v. Caldwell, 1 Kirby 53 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1786). 
226.  Id. at 53–54. 
227.  Id. at 55–56. 
228.  WOOD, supra note 66, at 191. 
229.  Id. 
230.  2 FARRAND, supra note 1, at 314–15. 
231.  Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa C. Leibowitz, Monopolies and the Constitution: A 
History of Crony Capitalism, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 983, 984 (2013).  
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practice of legislatively conferring “monopolies was a direct cause of the 
American Revolution.”232 
In addition to legislation conferring special financial and legal 
benefits, the economic and political turmoil during the war years led 
some powerful and influential statesmen to advocate laws that would 
confer special political benefits.233  At the extreme, “a cabal of the 
officers of the army” pushed for Congress to appoint George 
Washington to the position of King.234  Others, believing that 
republicanism could be restored once the political and economic crises 
passed, agitated for the legislature to appoint a temporary Dictator on 
the Roman model.235 
Given Americans’ recent experiences under British rule, talk of 
creating an undemocratic political hierarchy that lodged power in a 
small, known group must have seemed no idle threat.  Before 
independence, royal governors were entitled to reward loyal colonists 
with land and pensions.236  Most colonists bristled under this regime of 
“special favors and monopolies.”237  They viewed the royal procurement 
of loyalty by exercising the “power of patronage and preferment”238 as 
akin to the system of personal dependence that plagued the mother 
country.  They saw not just maladministration but a sinister design in the 
elevation of sycophants and flatterers to the detriment of men of virtue 
and talent.239  The royal governors offered colonists “opportunities for 
profits through the dispensing of government contracts and public 
money, thereby buying their support.”240  The people saw the creation of 
favored and disfavored citizens, and privileges based on personal 
relationships, as the foreshadowing of an English design to create an 
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American aristocracy.241  And indeed, to the vexation of the colonists, in 
the years leading up to the revolution, Parliament seriously considered 
establishing an American aristocracy to foster loyalty in the colonies.242   
In sum, their experiences during the late colonial and revolutionary 
periods, along with well-known British history, provided the framers, as 
they met in Philadelphia to draft the Constitution, ample examples of 
evils resulting from legislative power to enact special legislation.  They 
had witnessed populist fervor threaten personal security, property 
rights, and political equality.  They watched as their legislatures 
scapegoated and condemned individuals who were neither formally 
accused nor tried for political offenses.  They saw special interests take 
control of willing representatives and push private agendas through 
state legislatures at the expense of the public interest and in derogation 
of the very rights for which they purportedly had fought the British.  
They saw bills of attainder replicated by the thousands in their seats of 
liberty and, perhaps worse, directed at middling merchants rather than 
generals and ministers of state.  They saw that legal and political 
privilege insinuated itself into society, not by force, but rather by 
flattery, favors, and self-interest; and this privilege was perpetuated by 
enshrining special treatment for adherents of particular political beliefs.  
Opportunistic confiscations of property filled state coffers, and barriers 
to competition protected the well-connected.  The revolutionary 
generation had subjected their courts to oversight by the popular will, 
unbounded by logic or reason.  It was in this environment that they 
realized, perhaps for the first time, that tyranny of the majority was not 
only possible but actual; and although they were still in the process of 
articulating a workable theory of judicial review,243 they surely 
understood by 1787 that limitations on the legislature, to create a space 
safe from democracy, were a necessary component of a stable and just 
society.244  Indeed, by the time they arrived in Philadelphia to frame the 
new national government, they had in mind the object to put an end to 
laws that singled out individuals for special treatment,245 including both 
special benefit and special detriment legislation. 
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B. Revolutionary-Era Americans Affirmed a Commitment to Legislative 
Generality. 
By the end of the 1780s, the lessons learned from a decade of 
freedom had altered the mood of the nation and impressed themselves 
on the minds of the framers of the Constitution.  Their aversion to 
monarchy was tempered by a fear of unrestrained democracy.  As James 
Wilson succinctly summarized the lessons of the confederation period, 
“Is there no danger of a Legislative despotism?  Theory & practice both 
proclaim it.”246  Even democratically inclined anti-federalists concluded 
that the injustices of the years since independence were borne of an 
“excess of democracy” rather than from imperial design.247  Among the 
social ills that resulted from the tyranny of the majority, foremost was 
special legislation; indeed, the recognition of the evils of special 
legislation prompted, in no small part, the convocation of the 
Philadelphia Convention.248  It is not surprising, then, that when 
debating, drafting, and advocating for the ratification of the 
Constitution, the members of the generation that framed the 
Constitution affirmatively articulated a value of legislative generality 
and roundly rejected special legislation. 
1. The Revolutionary Generation Affirmatively Articulated a Value of 
Legislative Generality. 
James Wilson, among the most influential members of the 
Philadelphia Convention, and undoubtedly the most learned in the 
history and theory of government,249 articulated a strong theoretical 
defense of legislative generality.  In his highly regarded Lectures on 
Law, Wilson explained that “[l]aw is called a rule, in order to distinguish 
it from a . . . particular order.”250  The element of “uniformity,” he 
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argued, is essential to the definition of a law.251  Wilson described 
approvingly the ancient Saxon and Roman governments, and the 
modern Prussian government, as positive role models of legislative 
generality.  Perhaps idealizing ancient Saxon governance, Wilson 
recalled it as “uniform” in its “laws and liberties.”252  Describing the 
“science” of legislation in Rome, Wilson asserted that the object of the 
Roman legislative process was to ensure that there was “no regulation, 
which might produce a partial advantage” to a law’s sponsor or his 
friends or family.253  By contrast, Wilson argued, for any member of 
society to be “privileged from the awards of equal justice, is a disgrace, 
instead of being an honour.”254  Similarly, Wilson praised the idea, which 
he attributed to Frederick of Prussia,255 that “the poorest peasant is a 
man, as well as the king himself”; as a result, all are equal under the 
law.256  Wilson distinguished generality in law from the privileges that 
inhered in the recently rejected British system of government: in 
America, unlike in England, the “arcana of privilege, and the arcana of 
prerogative, are equally unknown.”257 
Wilson’s concept of legislative generality, that all are equally subject 
to the laws of society, was a basic premise on which he rested his 
defense of the structure of the new government of the United States.  
Wilson defended the power of Congress against the charge of despotism 
by asserting that the legislature may authorize penalties only “by 
general rules, and against all the members of the society 
indiscriminately.”258  In other words, the fact that all members in society, 
including the legislators themselves, must comply with the laws they 
enact, ensures that the legislature will act impartially.259  
Wilson’s theoretical defense of legislative generality was reflected in 
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the much-cited report of the Pennsylvania Council of Censors, which 
was charged with assessing the Pennsylvania Assembly’s compliance 
with its constitution.260  In language impossible to misunderstand, the 
Censors reproached the Assembly for enacting private laws in the years 
following independence.  The Censors proclaimed that the legislative 
power simply did not extend to deciding the rights of individual subjects 
in ways that deviated from the “promulgated standing laws.”261  Indeed, 
because the very definition of “law” included only “a rule prescribed or 
made beforehand,”262 special legislation did not fall within the definition 
of the word.  The Assembly violated this principle, the Censors wrote, 
by “extending their deliberations to the cases of individuals, who have 
been taught to consider an application to the legislature, as a shorter 
and more certain mode of obtaining relief . . . than the usual process of 
law.”263  The Censors reproached the Assembly for enacting laws that 
had the effect of “amend[ing] titles to land,” “dissolving . . . the bonds of 
marriage,” attainting suspects of “notorious frauds and other enormous 
crimes,” granting state benefits to citizens,264 and deciding pending legal 
disputes.265 
Other prominent Americans, too, reaffirmed the criticisms of special 
legislation identified by the Censors.  Focusing on one type of special 
law identified by the Censors, Hamilton argued that the legislature has 
no power to revise court judgments.  Reacting to the pervasiveness of 
legislative interference in judicial business during the revolutionary era, 
Hamilton asserted that the “legislature, without exceeding its province, 
cannot reverse a determination once made in a particular case.”266  And 
in rare agreement with Hamilton, Jefferson criticized the newly 
independent Virginia legislature for “decid[ing] rights which should 
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have been left to judiciary controversy.”267  These notable statements 
reflect the broader awareness overtaking the revolutionary generation 
that the legislature simply did not have the power “to suspend, 
supercede, or render void by extemporary decrees . . . established 
standing laws,” even if these special laws were enacted in accordance 
with formal lawmaking requirements.268 
2. The Revolutionary Generation Rejected Special Benefit Legislation. 
After suffering through years of state grants of special privileges, by 
the end of the confederation period Americans were becoming 
convinced that “none were entitled to any rights, but such as were 
common to all.”269  Granting “peculiar privileges” either to individuals 
or to “any body of men” was considered “repugnant to the spirit of the 
American republics.”270  As a result, popular sentiment rejected the 
power assumed by state legislatures during the revolutionary era to 
bestow special benefits.  Among the special benefit laws criticized by the 
revolutionary generation, three types stand out: first, special laws 
granting exclusive legal and financial privileges; second, special laws 
appointing officers to positions of public trust; and third, special laws 
recognizing and confirming the elevation of some members of society 
over others. 
First, the highly influential Vermont Council of Censors, which, like 
its analog in Pennsylvania, catalogued its legislature’s violations of its 
constitution, sharply criticized the Vermont legislature for granting 
special legal privileges during the revolutionary period.  Among other 
abuses, the Censors chided the legislature for granting divorces to 
named parties and declaring them eligible to remarry, granting named 
individuals immunity from civil suit or nullifying judgments already 
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rendered against them, and even conferring criminal immunity on two 
individuals responsible for leading a riot.271  The Censors expressed 
bewilderment at the presumptuousness of the legislature’s decision to 
grant special exemptions from the standing laws.  The Censors asked, 
rhetorically, why a named individual “should be made an exception to 
the general rule” and “whence the authority was derived, that, in this 
instance, altered or dispensed with the operation of the law.”272  With 
equal fervor, the Pennsylvania Censors denounced the Pennsylvania 
Assembly for awarding public benefits to individuals on any basis other 
than a neutral assessment of services rendered to the commonwealth.273  
Similarly, as the state constitutional delegations considered the 
ratification of the Constitution, members reiterated the conviction that 
the legislature was not permitted to grant exclusive legal or financial 
privileges to individuals.  In the Virginia Ratifying Convention, 
delegates expressed concern that the new Constitution might be read to 
permit a European-style economic regime, in which favored merchants 
were given exclusive privileges at the expense of others.274  They 
opposed any reading of the Constitution that allowed Congress to grant 
these “exclusive privileges and immunities” either on federal lands or in 
the states.275 
A focal point of concern was the practice of granting exclusive rights 
to certain, named individuals to engage in a particular trade—a practice 
known as granting a monopoly.276  Common in Britain during the 
sixteenth century, this practice famously was criticized by Lord Coke in 
the Case of Monopolies, in which Coke opined that monopolies were 
opposed to the common law and against the Magna Charta.277  Because 
the American colonies were settled when Coke was most influential in 
England, his opinions, including his opinion that monopolies were 
unlawful, maintained longevity long after his fame declined in Britain 
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itself.278  In line with, and perhaps because of, Coke’s opinion in the Case 
of Monopolies, the confederation period saw popular sentiment reject 
the power of the legislature “to give monopolies of legal privilege—to 
bestow unequal portions of our common inheritance on favourites.”279  
The granting of monopolies, along with other “unequal or partial 
distribution of public benefits,” was attacked as tantamount to the 
“establishment of an aristocracy.”280  Writers bemoaned the 
compromised ideals of the new nation, which had been “sacrificed 
constantly to local views” and “lost in the scramble for private 
advantages and local favors.”281  No doubt it was this sentiment that led 
the people of Massachusetts to adopt a broad prohibition on special 
benefits in its Constitution of 1780.  Authored by John Adams, the 
Massachusetts Constitution provided that “[n]o man, nor corporation, 
or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or 
particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the 
community, than what arises from the consideration of services 
rendered to the public.”282  Expressing the same sentiment, the Virginia 
Declaration of Rights of 1776 declared that “no man, or set of men, are 
entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the 
community, but in consideration of public services.”283 
Second, the revolutionary generation rejected the power of the 
legislature to appoint officers to positions of public trust.  During the 
colonial period, the doling out of offices was the hated prerogative of 
the Crown.284  However, once the colonies became independent states 
dominated by their legislative branches, the appointment of favorites to 
offices of trust became the hallmark of the state legislatures.  The 
reaction was predictable: after the experience of the 1780s, Federalists 
argued credibly that the real danger to liberty came not from an 
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aristocracy, but from the ability of the legislature to hand out 
appointments to those eager to wrest private gain from the public fisc.285  
By the time of the ratification of the Constitution, the corruption caused 
by legislative appointments was widely acknowledged.286  In the 
Philadelphia Convention, the state legislatures’ abuse of the 
appointments process was cited as “proof” that the “Legislature was an 
improper body for appointments.”287  Wilson affirmed that “he had 
always thought the appointment of the Executives by the Legislative 
department wrong.”288  Madison articulated the theoretical defense of 
divesting the legislature of its historical power of appointment of 
officers: only by denying the legislature the power to appoint officers 
would those officers execute their positions free from the corruption 
that comes from dependence on the legislative branch.289  Wilson 
responded that the “proper cure . . . for corruption in the Legislature 
was to take from it the power of appointing to offices.”290 
Third, the American rejection of special benefit laws was intimately 
connected with their perception that special privileges were the first step 
toward establishing a hereditary aristocracy.291  As a result, throughout 
the ratification process, the revolutionary generation asserted that the 
legislature had no power to create special legal privileges for itself that 
distinguished it from the population at large.  John Adams, an early 
critic of unchecked legislative power, viewed special legislation as the 
method by which the legislature established itself as an aristocracy.292  
Anticipating Wilson’s later defense of the United States Constitution, 
Adams argued that an unchecked legislature will make “one little 
distinction after another” between its own prerogatives and the rights of 
the common people.293  An “unchecked” assembly, argued Adams, 
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would “exempt itself from the burdens it laid on its constituents, and 
pass and execute laws for its own benefit.”294  Although the special 
privileges will start small, each inequality introduced by the legislature 
will lead to greater usurpations, eventually allowing the state legislatures 
to subvert democracy entirely.295  Similarly, in the Virginia Ratifying 
Convention, George Nicholas argued that the proposed Constitution 
permitted the legislature to “pass no law but what will equally affect 
their own persons, their families, and property.”296 
The revolutionary era’s distrust of laws that smacked of aristocracy 
is best exemplified by the popular reaction to the Society of the 
Cincinnati, a fraternal order established by former Revolutionary War 
officers.297  Membership in the Society was limited to former 
Continental Army officers and their descendants; other than honorary 
members, no one could ever be a member of the Society except the 
officer himself and either his “eldest son or other heir at law.”298  
Reaction to the establishment of the Society was swift and ferocious.299  
Americans saw the creation of the Cincinnati as an attempt by the 
officers to establish a “hereditary Military Nobility.”300  Despite the fact 
that the organization was private in nature, and not sanctioned by the 
state, Americans were so sensitive even to the specter of the 
establishment of an American aristocracy that they insisted that the 
Society was “against the Confederation; against the letter of some of our 
constitutions; against the spirit of them all.”301  Overwhelming popular 
opposition to the Cincinnati led the well-respected Washington to 
demand that the Society eliminate the hereditary character of the 
organization’s membership.302 
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The strong opposition to privileges established by law did not end 
with the dustup over the Cincinnati; the delegates to the Philadelphia 
Convention agreed, without dissent, to prohibit both the states and the 
federal government from granting any titles of nobility.303  Through the 
addition of the Appointments Clause, they also affirmed that Congress 
could not itself exercise the power of appointment that was so abused by 
the state legislatures during the confederation period.304  In New York’s 
Constitutional Convention, a motion was made to explicitly prevent 
Congress from having the power “to grant monopolies, or erect any 
company with exclusive advantages of commerce.”305  And the newly 
constituted House of Representatives took the restriction on titles of 
nobility so seriously, if not literally, that it “formally & unanimously 
condemned” a suggestion to address President Washington as 
“Excellency” or even “Esquire.”306  Madison, although incredulous that 
merely ascribing a European-style title to the new President would 
precipitate an end to republicanism, agreed that titles “are not very 
reconcilable with the nature of our government, or the genius of the 
people”;307 this sentiment was widely shared by the end of the 1780s.308 
3. The Revolutionary Generation Rejected Special Detriment 
Legislation. 
The generation of the framing of the Constitution denounced special 
detriment legislation with equal vigor.  In recalling the attainder of 
Philips, Edmund Randolph called it “shocking,” declaring that he would 
sooner abandon his beloved home rather than see Virginia permit a 
repetition of such an “arbitrary deprivation of life.”309  Speaking of New 
York’s attainder of Loyalists during the revolution, John Jay stated that 
“New York is disgraced by injustice too palpable to admit even of 
palliation.”310  In sharp contrast with the zeal with which state 
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legislatures attainted suspected Tories during the revolution, the 
members of the Philadelphia Convention accepted the addition of the 
Bill of Attainder Clauses without debate.311  Indeed, by the time of the 
ratification of the federal Constitution, several states already had 
banned bills of attainder.312 
So, too, did the revolutionary generation come to regret the 
confiscations of property that were so rampant during the confederation 
period.  Citing Blackstone, Hamilton wrote that the confiscation of 
property by the legislature is a “gross and notorious . . . act of 
despotism,” tantamount to tyranny.313  The Pennsylvania Censors 
reflected the mood of the waning confederation years when it 
denounced its legislature for confiscating property of the 
Commonwealth’s inhabitants.314  Not surprisingly, by the time of the 
ratification of the Constitution, a number of states specifically protected 
property in their Constitutions from confiscation without judicial 
process.315 
Putting this widespread sentiment into theoretical terms, Wilson 
explained why the legislature lacks the power to enact laws that strip 
privileges from individually identified people.  As opposed to generally 
applicable laws, which may “be safely trusted to the representatives of 
the community,” laws that purport to act on individuals must be 
restrained in order to avoid injustice.316  If a corporate charter, public 
contract, or a citizen’s naturalization may be repealed by legislative act, 
Wilson argued, the legislature will manufacture any pretense, however 
specious, to harm individuals or known groups that run afoul of the 
majority will.317  In other words, because the majority is bound by a 
generally applicable law, majoritarianism ensures that generally 
applicable laws will be just.  By contrast, because the majority can agree 
to single out a single person for negative treatment, special laws are 
 
311.  2 FARRAND, supra note 1, at 375–76; CHAFEE, supra note 66, at 95. 
312.  CHAFEE, supra note 66, at 94–95; WOOD, supra note 66, at 436–37. 
313.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 186, at 474–75 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 145, at 101). 
314.  PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 132, at 39–40. 
315.  MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. X; N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, art. XII; PA. 
CONST. of 1776, art. VIII; VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, art. IX; VA. CONST. of 1776, § 6. 
316.  JAMES WILSON, Considerations on the Bank of North America 1785, in 
1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 250, at 60, 71. 
317.  Id. at 71–72. 
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prohibited because majoritarianism does not restrain the evils of special 
legislation. 
In sum, the history of the period leading up to the framing of the 
Constitution demonstrates that special legislation was a primary concern 
facing the revolutionary generation.  In the early years after 
independence, populist state legislatures levied all manner of injustices 
through special legislation.  They enacted bills of attainder, confiscated 
property, reversed court judgments, revoked corporate charters, and 
threatened to undermine republicanism in the new states by special 
grants of prerogative and privilege.  After a long decade of these abuses, 
both common and prominent members of the revolutionary generation 
reaffirmed a commitment to legislative generality and rejected the 
power of the legislature to enact special laws.  They rejected both 
special benefit and special detriment legislation, articulated a theoretical 
defense of legislative generality based on their inherited philosophical 
tradition, and began to enshrine protections against abusive special 
legislation in their state constitutions.  It was with these shared 
experiences that the framers gathered in Philadelphia to frame a 
government. 
C. Post-Ratification History’s Challenge to the Value of Legislative 
Generality 
As described above, special legislation was a significant source of 
suffering during the confederation period; and the revolutionary 
generation, including many of the Constitution’s framers, vehemently 
criticized special legislation as the revolutionary era drew to a close.  As 
a result, it would be only reasonable to suppose that Congress and state 
legislatures ceased enacting special legislation after the ratification of 
the Constitution.  This was not the case; indeed, legislatures continued 
to enact special legislation after the ratification of the Constitution, 
presenting a challenge to the conclusion that the history of the framing 
period supports a value of legislative generality.  The objection based on 
post-ratification history can be stated as follows: the fact that state 
legislatures and Congress enacted special legislation after the 
ratification of the Constitution suggests that, however real were the 
revolutionary generation’s concerns about special legislation, these 
concerns were not manifested in an enforceable constitutional value. 
Although this is a serious objection calling for an exploration of 
post-ratification history, an examination of the period following 
ratification supports the conclusion that the value of legislative 
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generality persisted after the ratification of the Constitution.  First, an 
examination of the special laws enacted by Congress immediately after 
ratification suggests that its members disapproved of the types of special 
legislation enacted by the revolutionary-era legislatures.  Second, an 
examination of the special laws that were proposed and rejected during 
the first years after ratification suggests that special legislation was still 
disfavored after ratification.  Third, doctrinal history suggests that the 
early Supreme Court enforced the value of legislative generality.  Taken 
together, this post-ratification history supports the conclusion that the 
value of legislative generality articulated by the framing generation 
survived the ratification of the Constitution. 
1. The Special Laws Enacted By the First Congress Do Not Evince an 
Acceptance of Special Legislation. 
Congress and state legislatures continued to enact special laws after 
the Constitution’s ratification.  Indeed, several private bills were 
enacted by the first Congress;318 state legislatures increasingly enacted 
private laws in the years after ratification, enacting more private laws 
than public laws until well into the nineteenth century.319  This evidence 
could suggest that the revolutionary generation’s concerns about special 
legislation were not enshrined in a right enforceable under the new 
Constitution.320 
However, a close examination of the special laws enacted by the first 
Congress does not lead to the conclusion that the framers accepted the 
constitutionality of special legislation in general.  First, the special laws 
enacted by the first Congress were, for lack of a better word, special.  
The vast majority, and perhaps all, of these special laws arose out of 
claims against the United States precipitated by the recently concluded 
war for independence.321  The first Congress’s special laws guaranteeing 
 
318.  E.g., Act of June 4, 1790, ch. 16, 6 Stat. 2 (“adjusting and satisfying the claims of 
Frederick William de Steuben”); Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 26, 6 Stat. 1 (allowing “the Baron 
de Glaubeck the pay of a Captain in the Army of the United States”). 
319.  Ireland, supra note 18, at 271–73. 
320.  Pfander & Wardon, supra note 99, at 399. 
321.  William C. diGiacomantonio, Petitioners and Their Grievances: A View from the 
First Federal Congress, in THE HOUSE AND SENATE IN THE 1790S: PETITIONING, LOBBYING, 
AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 29, 49, 53–54 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Donald R. 
Kennon eds., 2002); see, e.g., Act of Aug. 11, 1790, ch. 45, 6 Stat. 4 (providing relief for “the 
persons therein mentioned or described”); Act of Aug. 11, 1790, ch. 44, 6 Stat. 3 (providing 
relief to “disabled soldiers and seamen lately in the service of the United States, and certain 
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pensions for the wounded,322 benefits for the widowed323 and 
orphaned,324 and reimbursement for those whose property was 
commandeered during the war325 are best seen as “cleanup” laws 
designed to settle the accounts of the United States for debts incurred 
during the confederation period before Congress came into existence.  
Congress paid these claims not as a gratuity but “only when it felt 
contractually bound to do so.”326 
Second, many of the laws enacted by the first Congress that named 
individuals were “special” neither within the strict definition nor spirit 
of the word because they did not single out the individuals named in the 
laws for special treatment.  By contrast, these laws were generalizing; 
that is, they ensured that the named individuals would be treated the 
same as others similarly situated.327  For example, the first Congress 
granted death benefits to the widow and orphan, respectively, of two 
men killed in battle.328  In this same law, however, Congress also 
provided that “the widow or orphan of each officer, non-commissioned 
officer, or soldier, who was killed or died whilst in the service of the 
United States” was entitled to a pension.329  Similarly, a private law 
granting a pension to a particular foreign officer who served in the 
United States army during the Revolutionary War provided that he was 
to be paid “in the same manner as other foreign officers in the service of 
the United States” had been paid.330   
Third, early special laws, while on their terms providing special 
benefits, often were enacted as precursors to generally applicable laws 
that would be enacted at a later time.  For example, the first Congress 
provided for the payment of pensions for certain disabled soldiers by 
 
other persons”); ch. 16, 6 Stat. 2; ch. 26, 6 Stat. 1. 
322.  Ch. 44, 6 Stat. 3. 
323.  Act of Feb. 27, 1793, ch. 14, 6 Stat. 12 (“making provision for the persons therein 
mentioned”); ch. 45, 6 Stat. 4. 
324.  Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 28, 6 Stat. 12 (“providing an annual allowance for the 
education of Hugh Mercer”); ch. 14, 6 Stat. 12; ch. 45, § 2, 6 Stat. at 5. 
325.  Act of Apr. 13, 1792, ch. 21, 6 Stat. 8 (compensating “the corporation of trustees of 
the public grammar school and academy of Wilmington, in the state of Delaware, for the 
occupation of, and damages to, the said school during the war”). 
326.  DiGiacomantonio, supra note 321, at 49. 
327.  Ch. 45, § 4, 6 Stat. at 5; ch. 44, § 5, 6 Stat. at 4. 
328.  Ch. 45, §§ 1–2, 4, 6 Stat. at 4–5. 
329.  Id. § 4, 6 Stat. at 5. 
330.  Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 26, 6 Stat. 1. 
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name.331  However, in this same statute, Congress provided that the 
pensions for the named soldiers “shall be paid, according to such laws as 
. . . shall be made relative to invalid pensioners” and that back pay for 
pension arrears should be paid “in such manner as Congress may 
hereafter provide.”332 
In sum, the special laws enacted by the first Congress were, in a 
sense, sui generis: they reimbursed individuals who had valid legal 
claims that arose before the existence of Congress; they ensured that 
similarly situated individuals would be treated alike rather than 
differently; and they established that the named individuals would be 
included in the class of people who would benefit from generally 
applicable rules once general laws were enacted by Congress.  They bear 
little resemblance to the special laws enacted by the states and criticized 
by the revolutionary generation prior to the ratification of the 
Constitution.  As a result, no fair reading of these laws can serve as 
evidence that special laws were accepted without qualification by the 
revolutionary generation. 
2. The First Congress Failed to Enact a Wide Variety of Special Laws. 
In addition to examining laws that were enacted by the first 
Congress, it is also instructive to examine the types of laws that were not 
enacted during this period.  Although Congressional silence is not 
always good evidence of intent, silence is perhaps more probative when 
compared with the track record of legislation in the years leading up to 
the ratification.  It is true that the first Congress enacted the arguably 
special laws described above; however it must be recalled that the first 
Congress did not enact most of the types of special laws so criticized by 
the founding generation.  As noted above, before the ratification of the 
Constitution, state legislatures enacted countless bills of attainder, laws 
confiscating property, laws immunizing named individuals from civil suit 
and nullifying judgments already rendered against them, and laws 
providing immunity from criminal prosecution, as well as laws granting 
special financial benefits and exemptions from generally applicable 
laws.333  No law like these, which were so harshly criticized by the 
framing generation, was enacted by the first Congress.  Moreover, the 
 
331.  Ch. 44, § 1, 6 Stat. at 3. 
332.  Id. § 5, 6 Stat. at 4. 
333.  See supra part V.A. 
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first Congress ignored most of the private petitions presented to it 
because the petitions did not reflect previously existing legal 
obligations.334  The first Congress also declined to pass a number of bills 
aimed at providing funding for particular projects with merely local 
effect.335  The sharp curtailing of special laws, which abounded just a few 
years earlier, strongly suggests that the first Congress recognized that 
these types of special laws were no longer acceptable after the 
ratification of the Constitution.336 
3. The Early Court Recognized a Value of Legislative Generality. 
Just as the explosion of special laws in the mid-nineteenth century 
obscures their marked decrease immediately after the ratification of the 
Constitution, the Supreme Court’s modern indifference toward special 
legislation belies the early Court’s dim view of its constitutionality.  
Indeed, in many of its best-known decisions—including the Dartmouth 
College Case, Fletcher v. Peck, and McCulloch v. Maryland—the early 
Supreme Court invalidated special legislation.  Although these cases are 
known for their expansive interpretation of the powers of the new 
federal government, a fair reading of these cases must take note of the 
way that they criticize, and ultimately invalidate, special legislation.  
This view of early post-ratification doctrinal history suggests that the 
value of legislative generality, although now all but ignored by the 
Court, once was an enforced value. 
In the Dartmouth College Case, the legislature of the State of New 
Hampshire intervened in a dispute between the president and trustees 
of Dartmouth College.  After the trustees deposed Dartmouth’s 
president, the legislature transferred the assets of the College to the 
 
334.  DiGiacomantonio, supra note 321, at 53–54. 
335.  Id.  
336.  For reasons of space, a comprehensive review of state legislation after ratification 
is beyond the scope of this article.  However, an initial inquiry reveals that the states enacted 
far fewer special laws in the years following the ratification of the Constitution.  In Delaware, 
special laws decreased by approximately 25% from the two-year period before ratification to 
the two-year period after ratification.  See, e.g., THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, IN 
TWO VOLUMES (New Castle, Samuel Adams & John Adams 1798).  Moreover, although 
Delaware’s pre-ratification special laws included the types of laws criticized by the 
revolutionary generation—including laws that named individuals to government positions, 
disallowed named individuals from a generally applicable amnesty, and granted public wealth 
to private individuals—in the years immediately following ratification, Delaware’s special 
laws were limited to incorporating business associations and permitting the reformation of 
wills.  Id. 
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newly created Dartmouth University.337  Daniel Webster, on behalf of 
the College, argued that the legislature’s attempt to single out a 
particular corporation and give its property to another was 
unconstitutional because “these acts are not the exercise of a power 
properly legislative.”338  Webster argued that “acts of the legislature, 
which affect only particular persons and their particular privileges” are 
not, properly speaking, laws.339  In his opinion, Justice Story agreed with 
Webster that New Hampshire’s statute was defective because it was 
special, as opposed to general, legislation.  Story distinguished New 
Hampshire’s statute from a general law that permitted individuals to 
divorce, arguably breaking their marriage contract.  Story held that 
“general laws regulating divorces” certainly were not prohibited by the 
Contract Clause.340  By contrast, the dissolution of a particular marriage, 
like New Hampshire’s special statute, “entrench[ed] upon the 
prohibition of the constitution.”341  A corollary to this rule, wrote Story, 
is that the legislature may not “lawfully take the property of A. and give 
it to B.”342  In light of this distinction, Story rejected the power of the 
New Hampshire legislature to transfer the property of Dartmouth 
College to the newly created Dartmouth University.343 
The distinction in Dartmouth College between general and special 
laws reaffirmed the principle that the Court previously made explicit in 
Fletcher v. Peck.  In Fletcher, the legislature of the State of Georgia 
enacted a statute authorizing the governor to sell state-owned land.344  
When it came to light that the original sale of land may have been 
tainted by bribery, a newly elected legislature enacted a statute 
purporting to nullify the previous act.345  Peck’s counsel argued that the 
power to declare legislation authorizing the sale of land void was not a 
legislative power: “It is the province of the judiciary to say what the law 
is, or what it was.  The legislature can only say what it shall be.”346  Chief 
Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, adopted this limitation on the 
 
337.  Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 546–47 (1819). 
338.  Id. at 558. 
339.  Id. at 580. 
340.  Id. at 696 (opinion of Story, J.). 
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343.  Id. at 712. 
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power of the legislature and restated it forcefully.  Marshall conceded 
that “[t]o the legislature all legislative power is granted”; but this truism, 
Marshall wrote, did not resolve the question of the scope of legislative 
power.347  The real question is whether an act nullifying the power to 
transfer a particular parcel of land is even a legislative act.  Marshall 
answered in the negative: “It is the peculiar province of the legislature 
to prescribe general rules for the government of society; the application 
of those rules to individuals in society would seem to be the duty of 
other departments.”348  Because the Georgia legislature’s second statute 
was not a general rule for the government of society, it simply was 
outside the scope of the legislative authority.349 
The principle articulated in Fletcher and Dartmouth is evident in the 
results of other Marshall Court cases as well.  In McCulloch, the Court 
struck down a tax imposed by the legislature of Maryland that was 
“levelled exclusively at the branch of the United States’ Bank 
established in Maryland.”350  In striking down the tax, the Court 
emphasized that its unconstitutionality was linked to its special nature.  
The Court held that Maryland’s tax would not have been 
unconstitutional if it were confined to taxing “the real property of the 
bank, in common with the other real property within the State.”351  In 
other words, the fact that the tax was levied on a single institution drove 
the conclusion that it was unconstitutional; by contrast, a tax levied 
generally would not be unconstitutional.352   
Read together, these early Court opinions suggest that special laws 
enacted after the ratification of the Constitution were disfavored 
 
347.  Id. at 136. 
348.  Id. (emphasis added). 
349.  Id.  Moreover, the clause of the Constitution prohibiting bills of attainder, ex post 
facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts also restricts the power of the state 
legislature to nullify a previously enacted statute. 
350.  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 392 (1819). 
351.  Id. at 436 (emphasis added). 
352.  Similarly, in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), the Court struck down 
a New York state law that granted two individuals the exclusive right to use steam navigation 
on all of the waters of New York for thirty years.  22 U.S. at 6–7.  Meanwhile, an act of 
Congress provided a generally applicable law for licensing and regulating ships.  Id. at 28.  
Although the Court did not address the question of special legislation directly, in striking 
down the state law granting the special privilege, it did note that federal law, unlike the state 
statute, provided a method of licensing that “applies to every vessel.”  Id. at 220.  In so noting, 
the Gibbons Court suggests that its decision took into account the fact that it was striking 
down a special law in favor of a general one. 
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because of their particularized nature.  Although these Marshall Court 
cases are remembered for their expansive reading of federal power, 
reading them closely reveals that the special nature of the laws at issue 
was an integral part of the Court’s decision to strike them down. 
Reading these Marshall Court cases as consistently disfavoring 
special legislation also helps make sense of the Court’s earlier Calder v. 
Bull353 decision.  In Calder, the Court upheld the right of Connecticut’s 
lawmaking body, the General Court, to vacate a lower court judgment 
and grant a new trial to the losing party.  As each of the Justices took 
great pains to clarify, the action of the General Court did not trigger the 
restrictions of the Ex Post Facto Clause because the grant of a new trial 
was not a law.  Each of the Justices writing opinions noted that, at the 
time Calder was decided, Connecticut’s General Court sat both as a 
legislature and as a court of appeal, much like the English House of 
Lords.354  Each Justice opined that the Ex Post Facto Clause did not 
reach the General Court’s grant of a new trial because the General 
Court was acting in its judicial capacity rather than in its legislative 
capacity; in other words, the Ex Post Facto Clause did not apply because 
the General Court simply had not enacted a law.355  Although the 
Court’s distinction between the judicial and legislative functions of the 
General Court may seem strained, it makes perfect sense in light of a 
preexisting value of legislative generality.  If the order granting a new 
trial was considered to be a legislative act, it would have been a special 
law.  As a result, in light of the value of legislative generality, the only 
way the Court could affirm the act of the General Court was to find that 
the action of the General Court was not a law at all, which is precisely 
what the Court did.  In the absence of a value of legislative generality, it 
would have been possible, and far simpler, for the Court to rest on its 
alternative ground that the Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to 
criminal laws.  The Court’s insistence that the grant of a new trial was 
not a law makes sense only in light of the constraint imposed by the 
value of legislative generality. 
In sum, the history of the revolutionary period strongly suggests the 
existence of a value of legislative generality at the time of the 
ratification of the Constitution.  Although the post-ratification history is 
 
353.  Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). 
354.  Id. at 395 (opinion of Paterson, J.). 
355.  Id. at 387–88 (opinion of Chase, J.); id. at 400–01 (opinion of Cushing, J.). 
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decidedly more mixed,356 it does not vitiate the basic lessons of the 
revolutionary period.  A fair reading of the post-ratification history 
indicates that the first Congress did not sanguinely continue the states’ 
pre-Constitution practice of enacting special legislation without 
restraint.  Rather, the worst types of special laws ceased immediately 
after ratification.  Special laws enacted after ratification included, by 
contrast, “clean-up” legislation designed to settle the accounts of the 
Congress from the confederation period and legislative precedents for 
future general laws on similar subjects, such as pensions.  The Supreme 
Court’s early cases strongly suggest that special legislation continued to 
be disfavored after ratification of the Constitution, at least during the 
republic’s first decades.  For these reasons, even considering the post-
ratification history of special laws, the history of the revolutionary 
period indicates strong support for the value of legislative generality. 
VI. THE CONTOURS OF THE VALUE OF LEGISLATIVE GENERALITY 
AND THE IMPACT OF ITS REVIVAL 
The precise contours of the value of legislative generality, and a 
comprehensive evaluation of the impact of its enforcement,  must wait 
 
356.  The existence of special legislation after ratification is in some tension with the 
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always has characterized electoral politics.  1 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND 
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entirely at odds with positions he took in the Virginia Constitutional Convention.  Id.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, Madison later remarked that “legislative precedents are . . . entitled 
to little respect” when interpreting the Constitution.  Letter from James Madison to Judge 
Spencer Roane (May 6, 1821), in 2 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON: RETIREMENT SERIES 
317 (David B. Mattern, J.C.A. Stagg & Mary Parke Johnson eds., 2013); Letter from James 
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Congress.  Michael Bhargava, The First Congress Canon and the Supreme Court’s Use of 
History, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1745, 1767–68 (2006).  For these reasons, perhaps, the Supreme 
Court’s reliance on post-ratification history to interpret the Constitution has been mixed.  As 
the Court recently reiterated, “post-enactment” history is a “contradiction in terms”; it is “not 
a legitimate tool” of interpretation because statements made after a provision is enacted have 
no bearing on the intention of those enacting that provision.  Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 
S. Ct. 1068, 1081–82 (2011). 
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until after an articulation of the value’s textual and philosophical 
underpinnings.  Nevertheless, the foregoing historical evidence allows us 
to draw some preliminary conclusions with a fair degree of confidence.  
First, the history of the revolutionary period suggests the types of special 
laws that are disfavored by the value of legislative generality.  Second, 
judicial recognition of this value should lead courts to modify doctrine 
related to special legislation.  Third, enforcing a value of legislative 
generality would improve jurisprudence by making judicial doctrines 
related to special legislation more coherent. 
A. The Contours of the Value of Legislative Generality 
The history of the revolutionary era strongly suggests that legislative 
generality is a value of constitutional dimension.  The most prevalent, 
and most offensive, of the legislative abuses unleashed after 
independence came in the form of special laws.  After a decade of 
abusive special legislation, members of the revolutionary generation 
rejected the power of the legislature to enact special laws.  They 
affirmed their commitment to the value of legislative generality both by 
articulating a theoretical defense of this value and by enshrining 
protections against abusive special legislation in their state constitutions.  
By the time they arrived in Philadelphia to frame the new national 
government, they had in mind the object to put an end to laws that 
singled out individuals or groups for special treatment, including special 
benefit and special detriment legislation.  The revolutionary 
generation’s commitment to legislative generality is evident in the early 
legislative and judicial practice of the new republic.  Congress enacted 
few special laws after ratification and none of the types most criticized 
during the confederation period.  The early Court enforced the value of 
legislative generality by criticizing, and ultimately invalidating, a number 
of special laws.357  For these reasons, any court or scholar who considers 
the history of the framing of the Constitution probative of its 
interpretation should treat the value of legislative generality as an 
independent constitutional principle and evaluate the constitutionality 
of legislation in light of this principle. 
Having evaluated the history of the framing period, the central tenet 
of the value of legislative generality is easy to state: the value of 
legislative generality disfavors legislation that singles out a person or 
 
357.  See supra Part V. 
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small, identifiable group for special treatment to which the general 
population is not subject.  The core commitments of the value of 
legislative generality prohibit the legislature from: granting special 
benefits, like licenses and transfers of property; levying special harms, 
like confiscation of property and deprivation of liberty; interfering with 
both civil and criminal judicial processes for named claimants or 
defendants; declaring the proper interpretation of a standing law in a 
particular case; declaring void a previously enacted law; and transferring 
property from one person to another. 
In addition to these core commitments, the history of the 
revolutionary generation suggests some broader principles that help 
guide the interpretation of the value of legislative generality.  The value 
of legislative generality is less likely to disfavor special laws that 
prefigure generally applicable laws, like a law incorporating a particular 
corporation that also applies generally to future corporations.  Similarly, 
the value of legislative generality is less likely to disfavor special laws 
that eliminate, rather than create, disparities between people, like a law 
that ensures that an individual is treated the same as others similarly 
situated.  Nevertheless, even if extenuating circumstances require the 
enactment of special legislation, the core commitments to the value of 
legislative generality, stated above, should be respected.358 
B. Enforcing the Value of Legislative Generality Will Require the Court 
to Modify Doctrine Related to Special Legislation. 
Modern Supreme Court jurisprudence rejects the argument that 
“there is something wrong with particularized legislative action,”359 
measuring special legislation instead against deferential doctrines like 
equal protection, due process, and separation of powers, rather than 
against an independent principle of legislative generality.360  As a result, 
restrictions on special legislation are weak, and both Congress and state 
legislatures freely enact special laws.  Among the most common modern 
special laws, legislatures enact statutes transferring public funds to 
named natural persons361 or corporations,362 granting exemptions from 
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359.  Plaut, 514 U.S. at 239 n.9. 
360.  See supra text accompanying notes 92–102. 
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565 (2013); Priv. L. No, 108-5, 118 Stat. 4030 (2004); Priv. L. No. 107-2, 116 Stat. 3119 (2002); 
Priv. L. No. 103-5, 108 Stat. 5064 (1994); Priv. L. No. 103-3, 108 Stat. 5062 (1994). 
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generally applicable statutes and regulations,363 singling out individuals 
for special legal disabilities,364 confiscating particular pieces of 
property,365 levying special detriments on particular corporations,366 and 
abrogating specific contracts.367   
The value of legislative generality as described above suggests that, 
notwithstanding the Court’s modern jurisprudence, there is something 
wrong with particularized legislative action.368  As a result, courts should 
invalidate special laws that violate this principle.  For example, courts 
should invalidate laws like Terri’s Law, which applied only to “any 
parent” of a particular person, granting a special exemption from 
generally applicable jurisdictional rules without prefiguring generally 
applicable laws.  Similarly, courts should invalidate private immigration 
laws, which violate the principle of legislative generality by relieving 
named individuals from generally applicable laws governing 
immigration and naturalization.369  Courts also should invalidate the 
numerous special laws that Congress and state legislatures bury in 
unrelated public laws; for example, Congress’s transfer of public wealth 
to the widows of two deceased Senators by name370 should be struck 
down as violative of the principle of legislative generality. 
Some special laws do not implicate the core commitments of the 
value of legislative generality; for example, a legislature might enact a 
 
362.  Rubin, supra note 18, at 398 n.22; see also Wakefield, supra note 50, at 853. 
363.  Priv. L. No. 111-2, 124 Stat. 4525 (2010); Priv. L. No. 111-1, 124 Stat. 4523 (2010); 
Priv. L. No. 108-6, 118 Stat. 4032 (2004); Priv. L. No. 108-4, 118 Stat. 4028 (2004); Priv. L. No. 
108-3, 118 Stat. 4026 (2004); Priv. L. No. 108-1, 118 Stat. 4023 (2004); Priv. L. No. 107-5, 116 
Stat. 3123 (2002); Priv. L. No. 107-1, 115 Stat. 2471 (2001) (all granting exemptions from the 
Immigration and Nationality Act and reducing the total number of Visas otherwise available); 
see also Priv. L. No. 105-4, 111 Stat. 2699 (1997) (granting citizenship retroactively to permit 
beneficiary to be eligible for benefits only available to citizens). 
364.  Elizabeth Morgan Act, Pub. L. No. 104-205, § 350, 110 Stat. 2951, 2979 (1996).   
365.  See Mt. Soledad Veterans Memorial Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 109-272, § 2, 
120 Stat. 770, 770–72 (2006); Paulson v. City of San Diego, 475 F.3d 1047, 1048 (9th Cir. 
2007); see also 16 U.S.C. § 79c(b)(1) (2012); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 395 (1922). 
366.  E.g., Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412 n.13 
(1983) (citing Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 247–48 & n.20 (1978)). 
367.  U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 11–14 (1977). 
368.  Cf. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 n.9 (1995). 
369.  E.g., Priv. L. No. 112-1 (2012); Priv. L. No. 111-2, 124 Stat. 4525 (2010); Priv. L. No. 
111-1, 124 Stat. 4523 (2010). 
370.  Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-46, § 145, 127 Stat. 558, 565 
(2013); Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-6, 
§ 1601, 127 Stat. 198, 426 (2013). 
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special law that eliminates disparities between people or sets the stage 
for future generally applicable laws, as did the first Congress.  The value 
of legislative generality would not necessarily counsel in favor of striking 
down such a law.  However, most special laws do no such thing; rather, 
they single out named individuals for special treatment, either to apply 
special detriments or grant special benefits.  Invalidation of these laws is 
consistent with the value of legislative generality as described by the 
historical experiences of the revolutionary generation. 
In order to accommodate the value of legislative generality, the 
Supreme Court will have to modify, albeit modestly, its standing 
doctrine.  With some exceptions, federal courts will entertain a 
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute only if the plaintiff alleges 
“injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct” 
that is “likely to be redressed by the requested relief.”371  A person who 
suffers harm that is merely “generalized and attenuated” from the 
claimed unlawful action does not qualify for Article III standing.372  
Many of the special laws discussed above cause harm that can be 
redressed consistent with these standing doctrine principles.  For 
example, the father whose court-ordered visitation rights were 
eliminated by Congress in the Elizabeth Morgan Act suffered a 
specified injury that can be traced to the Act and would be redressed by 
its invalidation.373 
A somewhat harder case is presented by laws that grant exemptions 
from generally applicable laws, like special immigration status laws.  
Recall that these laws confer preferential immigration status on named 
individuals, but at the price of reducing the number of visas available to 
individuals from the country of origin of the beneficiaries of the special 
law.374  As a result, for every person who is granted special immigration 
status, another person is, in a palpable way, harmed.  However, the visa 
applicant who was next in line for a visa, and was therefore harmed by 
the special immigration law, would not know that she was next in line 
for a visa and would, therefore, not know that she had been harmed by 
the law.  As a result, the person whose visa was denied as a direct 
 
371.  Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 598 (2007) (plurality 
opinion) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)) (internal quotation mark 
omitted). 
372.  Hein, 551 U.S. at 599 (plurality opinion). 
373.  See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
374.  E.g., 124 Stat. at 4525; 124 Stat. at 4523. 
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consequence of a special immigration law cannot trace her injury to that 
law.  In order to enforce a value of legislative generality meaningfully in 
the case of special immigration laws, therefore, the Court would have to 
expand the universe of individuals permitted to challenge these special 
laws.  But a modification of standing doctrine in the case of special 
immigration laws could be accomplished without seriously 
compromising the purpose of standing.  In the case of a special 
immigration law, standing could be expanded to include only current 
visa applicants from the country of origin of the beneficiary of the law.  
This modestly expanded definition of standing would permit meaningful 
enforcement of the value of legislative generality while, at the same 
time, limiting standing to individuals who have more than a generalized 
and attenuated interest in the constitutionality of immigration 
legislation. 
The value of legislative generality is hardest to square with current 
standing doctrine in the context of special financial benefit legislation.  
For example, the recent special laws that granted gratuitous payments to 
the widows to two deceased Senators benefitted these individuals at the 
expense of the public fisc.375  In general, no one has standing to 
challenge special financial benefit legislation because the Court has held 
that the interest of a taxpayer in the allocation of public money is too 
“generalized and attenuated” to qualify for Article III standing.376  
However, under the Flast exception to this general rule, a taxpayer has 
standing to challenge the unconstitutionality of a congressional transfer 
of wealth if the taxpayer shows that “the challenged enactment exceeds 
specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the 
congressional taxing and spending power.”377  A fair reading of Flast 
might permit a taxpayer to challenge a special financial benefit law on 
the theory that Congress violates the taxing and spending power by 
exercising that power in violation of the value of legislative generality.  
However, even if Flast does not apply by its terms to a challenge based 
on a violation of the principle of legislative generality, the Court could 
use Flast as a model for another, limited exception to the taxpayer 
standing rule for special financial benefit laws.  A new, limited exception 
to the taxpayer standing rules, modeled on Flast, would give meaning to 
 
375.  Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014, § 145; Consolidated and Further Continuing 
Appropriations Act, 2013, § 1601. 
376.  Hein, 551 U.S. at 599 (plurality opinion). 
377.  Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102–03 (1968). 
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the value of legislative generality but would not affect the overwhelming 
majority of Congress’s allocation decisions, which are done through 
general, as opposed to special, laws. 
C. The Value of Legislative Generality Provides Coherent Treatment of 
Special Legislation. 
Although a complete evaluation of the consequences of enforcing a 
value of legislative generality must wait until the completion of future 
work, one normatively attractive feature is readily apparent even now.  
The Court considers challenges to special legislation under a number of 
constitutional doctrines and has formulated a number of different tests, 
applied different standards, and deferred to the legislature in varying 
degrees, depending on the constitutional doctrine invoked, the subject 
matter of the legislation, and the status of the individual or group 
singled out for special treatment.  As a result, when courts invalidate 
special laws, they do so in an incoherent, and sometimes unpredictable, 
manner.  Enforcement of a value of legislative generality will bring 
coherence to current doctrine related to special legislation. 
1. A Value of Legislative Generality Disfavors Both Special Benefit 
and Special Detriment Legislation. 
The Court’s current doctrine provides significantly greater 
protections against laws that impose special detriments than those that 
provide special benefits.  For example, as noted above, the Court 
subjects a gratuitous payment from the public fisc to a named individual 
to virtually no scrutiny; by contrast, a law appropriating the same 
amount from the same individual might raise concerns under the Equal 
Protection, Ex Post Facto, or Takings Clauses.378  The incoherence 
between judicial review of special benefit and special detriment 
legislation would be corrected by enforcing a value of legislative 
generality that takes into account the historical experiences of the 
revolutionary generation.  The legislative abuses of the revolutionary 
period included not only special detriment statutes banishing 
individuals, confiscating property, and rescinding property rights, but 
also legislation granting monopoly rights, immunity from prosecution, 
office holding privileges, and unequal legal protections.379  The value of 
 
378.  See supra text accompanying notes 103–05. 
379.  See supra text accompanying notes 191–242 
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legislative generality strongly suggests, therefore, that both special 
benefit and special detriment laws are constitutionally suspect.  Judicial 
doctrine treating both special detriment and special benefit laws 
similarly would therefore be more coherent than the Court’s current 
doctrine. 
2. A Value of Legislative Generality Disfavors Both Criminal and Civil 
Special Legislation. 
Current doctrine distinguishes between special legislation that 
provides criminal penalties and special legislation that creates civil 
liability.  Because current jurisprudence protects against special laws 
more strongly in the criminal than in the civil context, otherwise 
identical laws are subjected to different levels of scrutiny depending on 
whether the court characterizes them as a criminal or civil laws.  As 
noted above, the FERA Amendments to the FCA revived particular 
dismissed cases.  Courts reviewing the constitutionality of these 
amendments focus on whether the FCA is criminal or civil rather than 
whether the FERA amendments provided special treatment for 
particular cases.  Because they do not take into account the special 
nature of the amendments, some courts have struck down the 
amendments as retroactive criminal laws while others have permitted 
them as civil laws.380  A value of legislative generality would eliminate 
this incoherence by disfavoring special legislation in both the criminal 
and civil contexts, as is suggested by the historical experiences of the 
revolutionary generation.  The revolutionary generation enacted, and 
ultimately came to repent of, both criminal and civil special statutes, 
including statutes preventing Tories from practicing their professions, 
statutes granting immunity from civil liability and criminal prosecution, 
statutes granting or withdrawing special property rights, and bills of 
attainder.381  This history strongly suggests that the constitutionality of 
the FERA Amendments, and laws like it, should not turn on whether a 
court characterizes the law as criminal or civil; rather, the essential issue 
is whether the law can be said to violate the principle of legislative 
generality. 
 
380.  See supra text accompanying notes 106–08. 
381.  See supra text accompanying notes 191–242. 
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3. A Value of Legislative Generality Disfavors Both State and Federal 
Special Legislation. 
The Court’s current jurisprudence draws a distinction between state 
laws and federal laws that single out individuals for special treatment.  
As noted above, a state law breaching a public contract, effectively 
singling out for detrimental treatment the party who contracted with the 
government, is reviewed with greater scrutiny than an identical federal 
breach of a public contract.382  A value of legislative generality would 
eliminate this incoherence by treating breaches of public contracts the 
same, no matter whether the law breaching the contract was state or 
federal in origin.  A value that treats federal and state breaches the same 
way reflects the historical experiences of the revolutionary generation.  
The special laws that impelled the revolutionary generation to reform 
their legal systems included not only their direct experiences with 
special laws enacted by their own state legislatures, but also the cultural 
memory of special laws enacted by Parliament in Britain.  Bills of 
attainder not only proliferated during the revolutionary war, but also 
were enacted for centuries by Parliament.383  American state grants of 
property to well-connected citizens mirrored the hated monopoly rights 
granted by Parliament in Britain.384  And the popular reaction to the 
Cincinnati was understandable only in light of the special legal privileges 
accorded by Parliament to the nobility in England.385  The fact that 
special laws rejected by the revolutionary generation included laws both 
originating in the states and, prior to that, in Parliament, suggests that a 
value disfavoring special laws should be enforced irrespective of the 
source of the law.  As a result, a value of legislative generality should 
operate to restrain both Congress and state legislatures. 
In sum, the Court’s jurisprudence does not provide coherent 
protections against special legislation; that is, protections against special 
legislation vary depending on whether the law at issue provides benefits 
or detriments, whether it is criminal or civil, and whether the law is a 
state or federal statute.  The Court is more deferential toward special 
legislation on certain subject matters, like immigration, than it is on 
others, like takings.  The Court’s doctrine forces lower courts to make 
 
382.  See supra text accompanying notes 109–11. 
383.  See supra text accompanying notes 194–215. 
384.  See supra text accompanying notes 136, 231–32. 
385.  See supra text accompanying notes 297–308. 
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distinctions, as in the case of the FERA Amendments, that lead to 
inconsistency between courts and unpredictability for legislatures.  The 
historical experiences of the revolutionary generation suggest that the 
value of legislative generality transcends these distinctions; accordingly, 
the constitutionality of special legislation should be measured against 
the value of legislative generality irrespective of the characteristics 
normally used to distinguish between different types of special laws.  In 
light of a value of legislative generality, a special law granting special 
immigration status should be scrutinized like a special law stripping a 
citizen of citizenship; a special law convicting a named party of a crime 
should be treated the same as a special law granting a named party 
immunity from prosecution; a special law granting public property to a 
private party should be scrutinized along with a special law confiscating 
private property.  By eliminating these distinctions, enforcing an 
independent principle of legislative generality will make the Court’s 
doctrine related to special legislation more coherent. 
VII.CONCLUSION 
I expect that the thesis of this article comes as a surprise even to 
readers steeped in constitutional law and history.  The power of the 
legislature to enact special legislation without meaningful or coherent 
constitutional restraints has been taken for granted by the courts and 
questioned only at the periphery by scholars.  But I do not suggest 
lightly that a value restraining special legislation should be revived as an 
enforceable constitutional principle.  Rather, I am compelled to this 
result by evidence of the historical experiences of the period leading up 
to the framing of the Constitution, the Constitution’s text, and its 
philosophical underpinnings. 
Because the full spectrum of issues implicated by reviving legislative 
generality as an enforceable constitutional value cannot possibly be 
addressed in the limited space of a single article, this piece is intended to 
be an introduction to the value of legislative generality rather than the 
last word on the subject.  In future work, I will explore the textual and 
philosophical justifications underlying the value of legislative generality; 
this inquiry may well suggest refinements to this principle as well as 
provide additional support for it.  No matter how the value of legislative 
generality develops, however, any judicial recognition of this value will 
serve an important goal of the Constitution: to create a “safe space” 
from democracy, a space in which individuals are insulated against a 
thoughtless or corrupt legislature, the vicissitudes of public opinion, and 
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the passions and prejudices of the majority. 
